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THE EMOTIONAL WOMAN *
ALENA M. ALLEN **
The emotional woman is nonexistent in the common law, but the reasonable
man is an indelible figure. Conceptions of reasonableness permeate nearly every
aspect of the law while emotion is largely absent. The reasonable man determines
negligence. Reasonable minds determine whether a contract has been formed.
Reasonable doubt stands between freedom and incarceration. The primacy of
reason in American jurisprudence is so engrained that it is rarely questioned or
critiqued. Although it seems axiomatic to equate socially desirable conduct with
reasonableness, this Article dissects how reasonableness became a central tenet
of American law and argues that continued adherence to reasonableness as the
optimal standard for evaluating conduct entrenches value-laden androcentric
norms. It further argues that, in practice, reasonableness is an ill-defined
construct masquerading as an objective standard. As such, instead of arguing for
a reasonable-woman standard of care, this Article departs from the standard
feminist critique and argues that reasonableness itself is inherently androcentric.
Thus, it argues that reasonableness is not the optimal standard for evaluating
tortious or criminal conduct. Using current social science research, this Article
argues that emotion is crucial to sound decision-making and proffers the
emotional-woman standard as a superior alternative to the reasonable man.
Lastly, this Article discusses implications for how the emotional-woman
standard furthers existing paradigms of feminist discourse.
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INTRODUCTION
Reasonableness is woven into countless facets of Anglo-American law. 1
Perhaps the primacy of reason can be traced back to Descartes’s famous quote:
“I think therefore I am.” 2 Descartes believed that thinking, or the awareness of
thinking, was the essence of being for humans. 3 Historically, many philosophers
have theorized that the ability to reason is central to the human existence. 4
Etymologically, “the words reasonable and rational are near synonyms.
Each derives from the Latin word ratio, meaning reason.” 5 The concept of
reason featured prominently among early Enlightenment philosophers,

1. See, e.g., John Gardner, The Mysterious Case of the Reasonable Person, 51 U. TORONTO L.J. 273,
273 (2001) (opining that the reasonable person “inhabit[s] every nook and cranny of the common law”);
Kevin P. Tobia, How People Judge What Is Reasonable, 70 ALA. L. REV. 293, 298 (2018) (“Reasonableness
sits at the core of various legal standards.”).
2. 1 RENÉ DESCARTES, THE PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF DESCARTES 101 (Elizabeth S.
Haldane & G.R.T. Ross trans., 9th prtg. 1973).
3. See PETER J. BOWLER, EVOLUTION: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA 57 (rev. ed. 1989)
(discussing Descartes’s theory of human superiority). For Descartes, the fundamental difference
between humans and animals is that animals follow a prefixed program while humans possess the ability
to respond based on experiences. See id.
4. See, e.g., supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text; Aristotle’s Ethics, STAN. ENCYC. PHIL.,
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-ethics/ [https://perma.cc/3Q7W-LXVA] (last revised June
15, 2018) (describing how Aristotle believed that “what sets humanity off from other species, giving us
the potential to live a better life, is our capacity to guide ourselves by using reason”); Tim Jankowiak,
Immanuel Kant, INTERNET ENCYC. PHIL., https://iep.utm.edu/kantview/ [https://perma.cc/W9UXRJTR] (detailing Kant’s argument that “[t]he natural purpose of humanity is the development of
reason”).
5. Alan Gewirth, The Rationality of Reasonableness, 57 SYNTHESE 225, 227 (1983).

99 N.C. L. REV. 1027 (2021)

2021]

THE EMOTIONAL WOMAN

1029

eventually leading to the centrality of reasonableness in Anglo-American law. 6
Early Justices invoked reason to guide their decision-making, sometimes linking
reason to natural law. 7
The first recorded decision using the phrase “reasonable man” in
negligence law was in Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co., 8 decided in 1856. 9 In
Blyth, negligence was defined as “the omission to do something which a
reasonable man, guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the
conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a prudent and
reasonable man would not do.” 10 In American jurisprudence, Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr. enshrined the reasonable man in the common law. 11 In the
ensuing decades, the fictitious reasonable man became an indelible figure in the
legal system, impacting the legal system more than any oft-celebrated jurist. 12

6. For example, the Online Etymology Dictionary describes the first recorded uses of “reasonable”
(fourteenth century) as meaning “having sound judgment, sane, rational.” Reasonable, ONLINE
ETYMOLOGY DICTIONARY, https://www.etymonline.com/word/reasonable [https://perma.cc/EHG5PXWJ]. It also describes the first uses of “rational” (late fourteenth century) as meaning “pertaining to
reason” and (mid-fifteenth century) “endowed with reason.” Rational, ONLINE ETYMOLOGY
DICTIONARY, https://www.etymonline.com/search?q=rational [https://perma.cc/85X2-H6V5].
7. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (finding that a law “that takes property
from A. and gives it to B . . . is against all reason and justice”); see also STEPHEN M. FELDMAN,
AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM PREMODERNISM TO POSTMODERNISM: AN INTELLECTUAL
VOYAGE 49–82 (2000) (discussing the importance of natural law during the premodern American
legal-thought era); ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 51 (1960) (linking
“right reason” with natural law).
8. [1856] 156 Eng. Rep. 1047 (LR Exch.).
9. Id. at 1047.
10. Id. at 1049.
11. See ALBERT W. ALSCHULER, LAW WITHOUT VALUES: THE LIFE, WORK, AND LEGACY
OF JUSTICE HOLMES 111–22 (2000) (discussing the evolution of Justice Holmes’s objective prudentman standard and comparing it to the British conceptualization of the reasonable man).
12. See Ronald K.L. Collins, Language, History and the Legal Process: A Profile of the “Reasonable
Man”, 8 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 311, 312–13 (1977).

99 N.C. L. REV. 1027 (2021)

1030

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99-4

In tort law, the reasonable man 13 is ubiquitous. 14 In contract law,
reasonableness is central to establishing whether a contract has been formed. 15
Courts determine whether an offer has been made based on “what an objective,
reasonable person would have understood.” 16 In criminal law, proving
reasonable provocation, 17 reasonable mistake, 18 reasonable force, 19 or reasonable
doubt 20 is the difference between freedom and incarceration. To prove rape, the
State must establish that the victim (most often a woman) displayed reasonable

13. This Article uses the term reasonable man in most instances instead of reasonable person because
reasonable man was the term used for centuries. As a result, masculine notions of reasonableness are
inextricably woven into the standard even when reasonable person is substituted for reasonable man.
See infra Section III.A.
14. The reasonable-man or reasonable-person test is the traditional test for whether a defendant
has breached their duty of care in tort law. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (AM. L. INST.
1965) (“Unless the actor is a child, the standard of conduct to which he must conform to avoid being
negligent is that of a reasonable man under like circumstances.”); see also, e.g., Francis H. Bohlen, The
Probable or the Natural Consequence as the Test of Liability in Negligence, 49 AM. L. REG. 79, 83 (1901)
(“The test is the conduct of the average reasonable man—not the ideal citizen, but the normal one.”
(footnote omitted)); Stephen G. Gilles, On Determining Negligence: Hand Formula Balancing, the
Reasonable Person Standard, and the Jury, 54 VAND. L. REV. 813, 822 (2001) (“For as long as there has
been a tort of negligence, American courts have defined negligence as conduct in which a reasonable
man . . . would not have engaged.”).
15. Larry A. DiMatteo, The Counterpoise of Contracts: The Reasonable Person Standard and the
Subjectivity of Judgment, 48 S.C. L. REV. 293, 296 (1997) (“The subjectivity of the factual inquiry was
replaced by the application of rules through the medium of the reasonable person. A party’s conduct,
not a party’s intent, would determine contractual liability.”).
16. E.g., Leonard v. PepsiCo, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 2d 116, 127 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff’d, 210 F.3d 88
(2d Cir. 2000).
17. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Vatcher, 781 N.E.2d 1277, 1281 (Mass. 2003) (“[T]he jury must
be able to infer that a reasonable person would have become sufficiently provoked . . . .”); State v.
Shane, 590 N.E.2d 272, 278 (Ohio 1992) (“[W]ords alone will not constitute reasonably sufficient
provocation to incite the use of deadly force in most situations.”); McClung v. Commonwealth, 212
S.E.2d 290, 292 (Va. 1975) (“[T]he jury could have concluded that [the defendant’s] conduct under
these circumstances was sufficient to provoke a reasonable person to fear or rage, or both.”); see also
Cynthia Lee, The Gay Panic Defense, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 471, 500 (2008) (noting that jurisdictions
commonly ask “if the reasonable person in the defendant’s shoes would have been provoked into a heat
of passion”).
18. See Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 61 (2014) (“[R]easonable men make mistakes of
law, too, and such mistakes are no less compatible with the concept of reasonable suspicion. Reasonable
suspicion arises from the combination of an officer’s understanding of the facts . . . and relevant law.
The officer may be reasonably mistaken on either ground.”).
19. See, e.g., State v. Prioleau, 664 A.2d 743, 751 (Conn. 1995) (noting that an instruction on
reasonable force is adequate if it informs the jury that it must “examine and evaluate the defendant’s
subjective belief as to the amount of force necessary” for self-defense); Waldron v. Roark, 902 N.W.2d
204, 218 (Neb. 2017) (noting that reasonable force is “generally considered to be that which an
ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, with the knowledge and in the situation of the arresting
officer, would deem necessary under the circumstances”).
20. See Ruffin v. State, 906 A.2d 360, 367 (Md. 2006) (“Many judges, attorneys and legal scholars
. . . have endorsed the use of an approved pattern jury instruction on reasonable doubt and the
presumption of innocence to ensure that a criminal defendant’s due process rights are protected and to
create uniformity in criminal jury trials.”).
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resistance. 21 The reasonable person is also omnipresent in workplace sexual
harassment cases where courts rely on the reasonable-person standard to
measure whether the behavior was sufficiently “severe or pervasive” to
constitute a hostile working environment. 22 Reasonableness also permeates
corporate law, 23 banking law, 24 and administrative law. 25 Further,
reasonableness is viewed as a desirable trait for judges who are expected to be
composed, rational, unemotional, and dispassionate. 26
Thus, the reasonable man and reasonableness have been apotheosized in
legal discourse. The reasonable man is a legal chameleon functioning “as a
descriptive model of human behavior and as a prescriptive norm for legal rules
and adjudicative outcomes.” 27 Despite its pervasive influence, the centrality of
reason in the fabric of American jurisprudence has rarely been questioned. 28
21. See, e.g., State v. Sanders, 449 S.W.3d 812, 818 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014) (defining forcible
compulsion as “[p]hysical force that overcomes reasonable resistance”). See generally Alena Allen, Rape
Messaging, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1033 (2018) (noting that much of the messaging about rape laws has
entrenched gender stereotypes).
22. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (explaining the application of the
reasonable-person standard).
23. See, e.g., Robert J. Rhee, The Tort Foundation of Duty of Care and Business Judgment, 88 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1139, 1171 (2013) (“The inquiry in corporation law focuses on the demonstrable effort
and the quality of decisionmaking as the measure of reasonableness, and thus an error in judgment is
not a wrong. The answer to the question—what would a reasonable director do?—does not lie in a
review of the substance of the business decisions, but instead on the substance of good faith and effort
made by the custodians toward the care of the corporation.” (footnote omitted)); Leo Strine, Jr.,
Lawrence A. Hamermesh, R. Franklin Balotti & Jeffrey M. Gorris, Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining
Role of Good Faith in Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629, 671 (2010) (“The Delaware Supreme Court
then made plain that the enhanced burden it was imposing on directors to show that they had a good
faith, reasonable basis to believe that the corporation faced a threat was designed ‘to ensure that a
defensive measure to thwart or impede a takeover is indeed motivated by a good faith concern for the
welfare of the corporation and its stockholders.’” (quoting Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493
A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985))).
24. See, e.g., Diane Lourdes Dick, Confronting the Certainty Imperative in Corporate Finance
Jurisprudence, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1461, 1524 (2011) (“As a final step, the court might test the
reasonableness of any outcome by comparing the end result to what would occur in the absence of
judicial intervention. Essentially, this final step assures that the court’s intervention does not
substantially deviate from the course that is most likely to be taken in the absence of judicial
involvement. It merely removes the rent-seeking, contractual arbitrage and other inefficiencies that
derive from the disparity between present-day economic realities and strict contractual rights.”).
25. See, e.g., Alyse Bertenthal, Administrative Reasonableness: An Empirical Analysis, 2020 WIS. L.
REV. 85, 86 (“[T]he outcome of administrative judicial review depends largely on determinations of
reasonableness . . . .”).
26. See, e.g., Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, To Be an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong.
121 (2009). In her confirmation hearing, then Judge Sonia Sotomayor testified that judges “apply law
to facts” rather than applying “feelings to facts.” Id.
27. Anne C. Dailey, Striving for Rationality, 86 VA. L. REV. 349, 351 (2000) (reviewing
JONATHAN LEAR, OPEN MINDED: WORKING OUT THE LOGIC OF THE SOUL (1998)).
28. A few legal scholars have criticized the reasonable-man standard. See, e.g., Naomi R. Cahn,
The Looseness of Legal Language: The Reasonable Woman Standard in Theory and in Practice, 77 CORNELL
L. REV. 1398, 1431 (1992) (acknowledging that gender is intertwined with the reasonable-person
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Reasonableness is not benign. Lurking in the DNA of the reasonable man is a
penchant for dominance and subjugation. 29 Many early American lawmakers
were Anglican and Puritan, and their beliefs inspired them to create a society
that was based on order, reason, and compliance. 30
Societal structures were designed based on the belief that women were
subordinate to men and that the husband was head of the household. 31
Similarly, early lawmakers conceived of laws designed to reinforce a hierarchy
where White people were superior to Indigenous and Black people. 32 Even
today, White men dominate the judiciary. Although White men are only thirty
percent of the national population, fifty-six percent of state supreme court
justices are White men. 33 Among all state court judges, only thirty-three
percent are women. 34
As Judge Guido Calabresi noted, the “ways of looking at what is reasonable
and what is not . . . inevitably derive from the point of view of those who
dominate law-making in a given society.” 35 Thus, it is difficult to untwine
androcentric views from the common law notion of reasonableness. At the heart
standard and advocating that the reasonable person be based upon an “androgynous” prototype); Lucy
Jewel, Does the Reasonable Man Have the Obsessive Compulsive Disorder?, 54 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
1049, 1085 (2019) (questioning whether the reasonable man is mentally ill and criticizing “the
reasonable man’s binary and categorical approach to legal process”); Robyn Martin, A Feminist View of
the Reasonable Man: An Alternative Approach to Liability in Negligence for Physical Injury, 23 ANGLO-AM.
L. REV. 334, 338–41 (1994) (noting the bias and masculinity embedded in the current standard); Ann
McGinley, Reasonable Men?, 45 CONN. L. REV. 1, 1 (2012) (arguing that the reasonable-man standard
in sexual harassment cases enshrines conceptions of masculinity into the law and ultimately harms
society).
29. See infra Section II.A; see also CHARLES W. MILLS, THE RACIAL CONTRACT 59–60 (1999)
(claiming that “basic inequality is asserted in the capacity of different human groups” in the context of
the “Racial Contract”).
30. See generally DAVID H. FISCHER, ALBION’S SEED: FOUR BRITISH FOLKWAYS IN AMERICA
(1989) (explaining the influence of religion and British culture on America).
31. Id. at 84.
32. Early notions of justice were not colorblind. For example, the statutory punishment for hog
stealing provided that a Black person was to receive thirty-nine lashes, while a White person’s sentence
was set at twenty-five lashes. WORKERS OF THE WRITERS PROGRAM, WORK PROJECTS ADMIN.,
THE NEGRO IN VIRGINIA 151 (1940). See generally IBRAM X. KENDI, STAMPED FROM THE
BEGINNING: THE DEFINITIVE HISTORY OF RACIST IDEAS IN AMERICA (2016) (discussing the
genesis and proliferation of racist ideas, which have created systems of oppression against Black
people).
33. LAILA ROBBINS & ALICIA BANNON, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., STATE SUPREME COURT
DIVERSITY 4 (2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/Report_State_
Supreme_Court_Diversity.pdf [https://perma.cc/CQH9-KHBG]. Men of color are eight percent of
state supreme court justices and women of color are seven percent. Alicia Bannon & Janna Aldestein,
State Supreme Court Diversity—February 2020 Update, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Feb. 20, 2020),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/state-supreme-court-diversity-february2020-update [https://perma.cc/P4K9-YSGN].
34. The American Bench 2018, NAT’L ASS’N WOMEN JUDGES, https://www.nawj.org/statistics/
2018-us-state-court-women-judges [https://perma.cc/F4L5-VFJJ].
35. See GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, AND THE LAW 22 (1985).
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of feminist legal theory is a desire to shine a light on the myriad ways in which
patriarchy has shaped the law, 36 institutions, 37 language, 38 and culture. 39 There
is a robust literature unmasking objective standards as inherently biased, 40 and
feminist scholars have critically analyzed the androcentric bias inherent in the
reasonable-man standard. 41
Interestingly, however, most feminist scholars have not argued that
framing the inquiry in terms of whether the conduct was reasonable perpetuates
the subordination of women. Instead, they have argued that the reasonableness
standard should reflect a feminine view of reasonableness. 42 Feminist
challenges to the male standard of reasonableness have been most successful in
the area of employment law and battered women self-defense cases.
In the employment context, the first judicial recognition of the reasonablewoman standard appeared in Judge Keith’s dissent in Rabidue v. Osceola Refining
Co. 43 In Osceola, the plaintiff was the only woman to hold a salaried management
position. 44 During that time, the common areas displayed pictures of nude or
scantily clad women. 45 In addition, male coworkers routinely used offensive
language to describe woman including, “whores,” “cunt,” “pussy,” and “tits.” 46
In his dissent, Judge Keith argued that “the reasonable person perspective fails
to account for the wide divergence between most women's views of appropriate

36. See, e.g., Robin L. West, Law’s Nobility, 17 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 385, 421 (2005) (describing
patriarchy in dominance feminism as “the ubiquitous controls of women’s work, reproduction, children,
and property, across cultures and across time, [which] are aimed at the appropriation of female
sexuality”).
37. See, e.g., Karen Gross, Re-Vision of the Bankruptcy System: New Images of Individual Debtors, 88
MICH. L. REV. 1506, 1554–56 (1990) (advocating a feminist perspective in bankruptcy proceedings
that focuses on women debtors and their experiences); Debora Halbert, Feminist Interpretations of
Intellectual Property, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 431, 432 (2006).
38. See, e.g., NANCY M. HENLEY, BODY POLITICS: POWER, SEX AND NONVERBAL
COMMUNICATION 80–81 (1977) (surveying studies of gender-specific language and arguing that
English is “loaded against women”); Sara Shute, Sexist Language and Sexism, in SEXIST LANGUAGE: A
MODERN PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS 23 (Mary Vetterling-Braggin ed., 1981) (noting that the
“elimination of sexist language is a necessary condition for eliminating sexism in any society”).
39. SHULAMITH FIRESTONE, THE DIALECTIC OF SEX: THE CASE FOR FEMINIST
REVOLUTION 140 (1970) (opining that, at best, women have an indirect role in culture and that women
contribute to culture by acting as the “raw fuel for the culture machine” by inspiring men’s creativity).
40. See, e.g., Andrew D. Leipold, Objective Tests and Subjective Bias: Some Problems of Discriminatory
Intent in the Criminal Law, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 559, 559–61 (1998); Govind Persad, When, and How,
Should Cognitive Bias Matter to Law?, 32 LAW. & INEQ. 31, 34–38 (2014).
41. See, e.g., Kellie A. Kalbac, Through the Eye of the Beholder: Sexual Harassment Under the
Reasonable Person Standard, 3 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 160, 162–63 (1994).
42. See, e.g., Leslie M. Kerns, A Feminist Perspective: Why Feminists Should Give the Reasonable
Woman Standard Another Chance, 10 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 195, 208–10 (2001).
43. 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986).
44. Id. at 623.
45. Id. at 623–24.
46. Id. at 624.
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sexual conduct and those of men.” 47 Therefore, he noted that unless the outlook
of the reasonable woman is adopted, the defendants as well as the courts are
permitted to sustain ingrained notions of reasonable behavior fashioned by the
offenders, in this case, men. 48
Five years later, the Ninth Circuit adopted the reasonable-woman
standard as the test for ascertaining whether a hostile work environment
existed. 49 In so doing, the court stated, “We adopt the perspective of a
reasonable woman primarily because we believe that a sex-blind reasonable
person standard tends to be male-biased and tends to systematically ignore the
experiences of women.” 50 In the self-defense context, the 1977 case of State v.
Wanrow 51 has been particularly influential. In Wanrow, the Washington
Supreme Court reversed a conviction for first-degree murder because the trial
court’s jury instructions regarding self-defense had erroneously held the female
defendant to “an objective standard of ‘reasonableness’ . . . [which suggested]
that the respondent’s conduct must be measured against that of a reasonable
male individual finding himself in the same circumstances.” 52 Although not
without its critics, 53 many scholars have argued that the adoption of standards
which include feminine notions of reasonableness are integral to bending
androcentric legal norms to reflect a woman’s perspective. 54
Instead of accepting reasonableness as the standard by which conduct
should be evaluated, this Article argues that reasonableness and the reasonable47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 626 (Keith, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id.
Ellison v. Brady, 942 F.2d 872, 878–79 (9th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 879.
559 P.2d 548 (Wash. 1977).
The court rooted its holding by referencing context, noting that

[u]ntil such time as the effects of that history are eradicated, care must be taken to assure that
our self-defense instructions afford women the right to have their conduct judged in light of
the individual physical handicaps which are the product of sex discrimination. To fail to do so
is to deny the right of the individual woman involved to trial by the same rules which are
applicable to male defendants.
Id. at 559.
53. See, e.g., Robert Unikel, “Reasonable” Doubts: A Critique of the Reasonable Woman Standard in
American Jurisprudence, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 326, 364 n.241 (1992) (“The use of the term ‘physical
handicaps’ suggests that the [Wanrow] court, while attempting to secure fair and equitable results for
the female litigant, regards women as fundamentally ‘disadvantaged’ or ‘handicapped.’ It is precisely
this type of language that perpetuates the notion that women are weaker than men and require ‘special
protection.’”).
54. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42
VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1197–1211 (1989) (using narratives drawn from cases and empirical sociological
work to argue for adoption of a reasonable-woman standard). See generally Wendy Pollack, Sexual
Harassment: Women’s Experience vs. Legal Definitions, 13 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 35 (1990) (using
women’s narratives to illuminate the distance between their perceptions of sexual harassment and those
embodied in many features of sexual harassment law).
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man standard should be critically examined, questioned, and challenged. The
centrality of reasonableness resulted from the world view of aristocratic White
men. Although it has been normalized to the point of rarely being discussed,
the reasonable-man standard is value laden. The reasonable-man standard
entrenches androcentric values into legal norms under the guise of objectivity.
Acceptable conduct is thus determined by the male-centric value of
reasonableness. This Article argues that legal frameworks based on
reasonableness are inherently sexist and entrench the subordination of women.
While other feminist scholars have accepted reasonableness as the optimal
standard, 55 this Article argues that reasonableness alone as a standard is not
optimal. On a broader level, the goal of this Article is to call attention to the
normalization and broad acceptance of emotion suppression in the law. In
addition, this Article seeks to draw attention to the lack of transparency
surrounding the application of the reasonable-man standard. Whereas the
reasonable-man standard furthers a legal fiction that the assessment of conduct
is based on objective unbiased norms, this Article suggests that jurors should
foreground their own beliefs about the emotional appropriateness of the actions
of litigants.
This Article also critiques the legal profession’s acceptance of the silencing
of traits most commonly associated with women in legal norms. This Article
argues that reasonableness is a gendered concept. Historically, the gendered
construct of the reasonable man excluded women and non-White men, both of
whom were deemed incapable of reason. When jurisprudence accepts
reasonableness as the solitary measure of how conduct should be judged, it
subordinates women and ignores scientific knowledge about decision-making.
This Article advocates for embracing emotion in the law and proceeds in four
parts.
Part I of this Article critiques the reasonable person as the basis for judging
conduct. It argues that the reasonable-person standard is difficult to apply, lacks
a consistent definition, and fails to reflect the perspectives of women and
minority groups. Part II discusses current social science research on the
centrality of emotion to decision-making. Part III offers the emotional-woman
standard as an alternative to the reasonable-man standard of care. It argues that
instead of assessing reasonableness, juries should assess whether the conduct of
the defendant was emotionally appropriate under the circumstances. Part IV
55. See Cahn, supra note 28, at 1406–10 (arguing that the reasonable-person standard should be
reformed to include the experiences of both women and other excluded groups); Krista J. Schoenheider,
Note, A Theory of Tort Liability for Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1461, 1486–
88 (1986) (advocating for the use of the reasonable-woman standard in sexual harassment cases); Note,
Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment Under Title VII, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1449, 1459
(1984) (recommending the use of a reasonable-victim standard to determine the offensiveness of
behavior in hostile work environment cases).
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discusses the emotional-woman standard in the context of contemporary
feminist scholarship and the implications of reconceptualizing the reasonableman standard. A brief conclusion follows.
I. CRITIQUES OF THE REASONABLE-MAN STANDARD
It is almost axiomatic for one to believe that what is reasonable in a given
situation can easily be determined. 56 However a close examination of the
concept of reasonableness reveals that an agreed upon definition is elusive.
Although the concept of reasonableness permeates almost every aspect of the
law, jurists, lawyers, and scholars cannot agree on how it should be defined.
Formulations of what is reasonable abound in tort and criminal law. Although
it seems self-evident that what is reasonable is obvious to all, Section I.A
highlights that the concept of reasonableness eludes definition. As such,
reasonableness as a legal construct is imprecise and ill defined.
A.

Reasonableness in Tort Law

The foundation of modern tort law is negligence. 57 In the average case, the
plaintiff is harmed when the defendant’s affirmative act causes them harm. As
an initial matter, an injured plaintiff must prove that the defendant owed them
a duty and that the defendant breached that duty. 58 The most recent Restatement
(Third) of Torts views duty broadly, noting that “[a]n actor ordinarily has a duty
to exercise reasonable care when the actor’s conduct creates a risk of physical
harm.” 59 Negligence occurs when
[a] person acts . . . [and] does not exercise reasonable care under all the
circumstances. Primary factors to consider in ascertaining whether the
person’s conduct lacks reasonable care are the foreseeable likelihood that
the person’s conduct will result in harm, the foreseeable severity of any
harm that may ensue, and the burden of precautions to eliminate or
reduce the risk of harm. 60

56. See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Misunderstanding Ability, Misallocating Responsibility, 68 BROOK.
L. REV. 1055, 1064 (2003) (“The reasonable person test converts the esoteric and intractable distinction
between reasonable and unreasonable risks into a comprehensible, intuitive inquiry.”).
57. See Fleming James, Jr., The Future of Negligence in Accident Law, 53 VA. L. REV. 911, 911 (1967)
(“[N]egligence is certainly the dominant concept in accident law . . . .”).
58. See, e.g., KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 61 (5th ed.
2017); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS § 5.1 (1999); W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E.
KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30 (W. Page Keeton
ed., 5th ed. 1984); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Restatement (Third) and the Place
of Duty in Negligence Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 657, 658 (2001).
59. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 7(a)
(AM. L. INST. 2010).
60. Id. § 3.
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The Restatement (Second) of Torts conceptualized negligence as care falling
below the conduct of a reasonable man, noting that “the standard of conduct to
which he must conform to avoid being negligent is that of a reasonable man
under like circumstances.” 61 Both formulations of negligence rely on
reasonableness to ascertain whether conduct falls below the standard of care.
Thus, failure to exercise reasonable care is deemed to be negligent. Although
the standard of reasonableness purports to be objective, 62 in practice it is rarely
objective. 63 Jurors charged with ascertaining whether the defendant’s conduct
was reasonable are given very little guidance about how to determine what
constitutes reasonable conduct. 64
There is not one widely accepted approach for determining
reasonableness. Generally, theories of reasonableness can be characterized as
normative theories, utilitarian theories, and moral theories. As described below,
these theories define reasonableness with different goals in mind. Normative
theories view reasonableness as quintessentially an analysis of what is normal,
common, or customary. 65 Utilitarian theories view conduct as reasonable if the
utility of the conduct is greater than the expected costs of the conduct taking
into account the foreseeable benefits and costs to everyone. 66 Moral theories of
61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (AM. L. INST. 1965). Section 283 comment (b)
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts further states that
[t]he words “reasonable man” denote a person exercising those qualities of attention,
knowledge, intelligence, and judgment which society requires of its members for the
protection of their own interests and the interests of others. It enables those who are to
determine whether the actor’s conduct is such as to subject him to liability for harm caused
thereby, to express their judgment in terms of the conduct of a human being. The fact that
this judgment is personified in a ‘man’ calls attention to the necessity of taking into account
the fallibility of human beings.
Id. at cmt. b.
62. The Restatement (Second) of Torts further elaborates that the reasonable-man standard
which the community demands must be an objective and external one, rather than that of the
individual judgment, good or bad, of the particular individual. It must be the same for all
persons, since the law can have no favorites; and yet allowance must be made for some of the
differences between individuals, the risk apparent to the actor, his capacity to meet it, and the
circumstances under which he must act.
Id. § 283 cmt. c.
63. Catharine Pierce Wells, Tort Law as Corrective Justice: A Pragmatic Justification for Jury
Adjudication, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2348, 2390 (1990) (“[C]urrent practices of tort adjudication confer
considerable discretion on tort juries to determine a just outcome that is suited to the individual case.
The latitude of the jury’s discretion is frequently overlooked and, when it is not overlooked, it is
frequently criticized.”).
64. See, e.g., N.Y. PATTERN CIV. JURY INSTRS. 2:10 (Westlaw through December 2020 update)
(“Negligence is lack of ordinary care. It is a failure to use that degree of care that a reasonably prudent
person would have used under the same circumstance”).
65. See infra Section I.A.1.a.
66. See infra Section I.A.1.b.
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reasonableness use the community’s view of morality and fairness to inform
how reasonableness is defined. 67 These differing views of reasonableness create
uncertain results when applying the reasonable-man standard.
1. Defining Reasonableness
a.

Normative Theories

Justice Holmes suggested a normative theory of reasonableness. Justice
Holmes viewed reasonableness as an inquiry into how the ordinary, reasonable
man typically acts and whether an ordinary, reasonable man in the defendant’s
position would have foreseen danger to others from the defendant’s conduct
under the known circumstances. 68 Similarly, Professor G.H.L. Fridman
observed that the reasonable man “is supposed to act in accordance with what
is normal and usual.” 69
Critics of this approach argue that framing what is reasonable with what
is normal can insulate conduct that should be deemed tortious. For example, in
The T.J. Hooper, 70 Judge Hand held that “[c]ourts must in the end say what is
required; there are precautions so imperative that even their universal disregard
will not excuse their omission.” 71 Similarly, when faced with a doctor’s decision
to forgo giving a patient a low-cost screening test for glaucoma because the
patient was at a low risk of having glaucoma, the Washington Supreme Court
held that “[t]he precaution of giving this test to detect the incidence of glaucoma
to patients under 40 years of age is so imperative that irrespective of . . . the
standards of the ophthalmology profession, it is the duty of the courts to say
what is required to protect patients.” 72 In a similar case, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court echoed the sentiment that reasonable should not be defined as customary
or normal, opining that the emphasis should be “on reasonable rather than
customary practices . . . [so] that custom will not shelter physicians who fail to
adopt advances in their respective fields and who consequently fail to conform
to the standard of care which both the profession and its patients have a right
to expect.” 73
Additionally, equating reasonable with normal and customary melds
dominant cultural norms into the common law. One cannot define normal
without delineating what is abnormal. Often times, normal is dictated by the

67. See infra Section I.A.1.c.
68. O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 95–96 (1881).
69. G.H.L. FRIDMAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TORTS 142 (1978).
70. 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
71. Id. at 740.
72. Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981, 983 (Wash. 1974); see also Gates v. Jensen, 595 P.2d 919, 923–
24 (Wash. 1979).
73. Nowatske v. Osterloh, 543 N.W.2d 265, 272 (Wis. 1996).
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dominant and powerful voices, which marginalizes differing viewpoints or
perspectives. 74
b.

Utilitarian Theories

Judge Hand, in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 75 framed reasonableness
as a cost-benefit analysis in what came to be referenced as the “Hand Formula”:
whether the burden of taking precautions against a foreseeable risk is less than
the foreseeable probability multiplied by the foreseeable gravity of threatened
harm to others if the precautions are not taken. 76 This law and economics theory
of negligence defines breach of duty or unreasonable conduct by comparing an
individual’s actual level of precaution with the level that minimizes social
costs. 77 As Judge Posner famously opined, “[L]iability for negligence is
designed to bring about an efficient level of accidents and safety.” 78
Framing reasonableness as a cost-benefit analysis has many challenges.
First, a cost-benefit analysis requires assigning a monetary value to things for
which there is no established market. 79 For example, the joy of being able to
play the piano or the loss of a loved one is intrinsically difficult to value. 80
Undeterred by the lack of market, scholars often use willingness to pay as a
means of gauging preferences and valuing life. 81 Thus, to monetize the intensity
of preferences, proponents of the utilitarian definition of reasonableness ask
how much individuals and governments would be willing to pay to have the
precaution taken. 82 Arguably, reducing negligence to a monetary calculation
74. See infra Section I.A.3.
75. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
76. Id. at 173. Judge Hand’s formulation became commonly known as the Hand Formula. The
Hand Formula is a test for determining negligence and focuses on the burden of taking precautions
against the risks threatened by the defendants’ conduct, the probability of harm, and the gravity of the
threatened harm. Id. Judge Hand stated: “Possibly it serves to bring this notion into relief to state it in
algebraic terms: if the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon
whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B < PL.” Id.
77. See John Prather Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 323, 328
(1973); see also William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Joint and Multiple Tortfeasors: An Economic
Analysis, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 517, 521–22 (1980); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Positive
Economic Theory of Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 851, 873–74 (1981).
78. Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 34 (1972).
79. Frank J. Vandall, Judge Posner’s Negligence-Efficiency Theory: A Critique, 35 EMORY L.J. 383,
384 (1986). In addition to requiring pricing of things which are difficult to price, assigning a price tag
to such things often reflects the fact finder’s biases. Id.
80. Charles C. Fischer, Forensic Economics and the Hedonic Value of Life, 1 J. LEGAL ECON. 12, 16–
17 (1991) (“The hedonic value of life cannot be measured directly, since there are no markets for what
makes life a desirable commodity--life’s joys and pleasures.”).
81. See Ariel Porat & Avraham Tabbach, Willingness To Pay, Death, Wealth, and Damages, 13 AM.
L. & ECON. REV. 45, 45 (2011) (arguing that willingness to pay as a criterion for valuing life should be
reconceptualized).
82. Lawrence G. Cetrulo & Suzanne Sheldon, How To Defend Against Claims for Hedonic Damages,
61 DEF. COUNS. J. 585, 589 (1994) (describing willingness to pay as valuing life by “measuring the

99 N.C. L. REV. 1027 (2021)

1040

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99-4

ensures that reasonableness will encourage wealth maximization and not utility
maximization. 83 Thus, reasonableness is divorced from trying to attain a just
result. Instead, reasonableness is achieved through wealth maximization. 84
Second, even when the costs associated with taking precautions are known,
cognitive biases will often cause defendants to make errors when judging
probabilities. 85 Finally, current theories of decision-making suggest that
humans do not carefully balance competing options when making decisions. 86
c.

Moral Theories

Generally, the corrective-justice theorists assess reasonableness by
examining the morality of the underlying conduct and eschew discussions of
economic efficiencies. 87 These theorists focus on the relationship between the
plaintiff and the defendant and the injustice that occurs when the defendant
infringes upon a right of the plaintiff and causes harm. 88 Professor Ernest
Weinrib argues that fault should be determined by Aristotelian and Kantian
principles of moral philosophy and that corrective justice in tort law is a matter
of restoring equality to those impaired by another’s wrongful conduct. 89 As
such, negligence is when a defendant fails to conform their behavior to the equal
status of others. 90 Under this definition of negligence, the operative lens is
whether the harm suffered by the plaintiff was caused by objectively wrongful
actions of the defendant. The moral relationship is validated through the

amount of money that individuals, governmental agencies or businesses are willing to pay to avoid or
reduce the risk of injury or death”).
83. See Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV.
311, 336 (1996).
84. See Vandall, supra note 79, at 398 (“If Judge Posner were to suggest that he never intended
actual prices to be used in his cost-benefit formula, it would still be flawed, because Posner’s negligenceefficiency theory does not identify the difficult task of a judge—reaching a just result.” (footnote
omitted)).
85. See John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 548–60 (2003)
(arguing that pervasive under or overestimation can seriously affect the law’s ability to incentivize
efficient behavior through the Hand Formula and that this effect must be taken into account when
designing legal rules).
86. See infra Part II (discussing the role that emotion plays in making decisions); see also Alan D.
Miller & Ronen Perry, The Reasonable Person, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 323, 328–48 (2012) (discussing
criticism of the welfare-maximizing definition of reasonableness).
87. See Richard W. Wright, The Efficiency Theory of Causation and Responsibility: Unscientific
Formalism and False Semantics, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 553, 578 (1987) (“[T]ort law, which is an
expression of individual rights and individual responsibility, has no room for the efficiency theory.”).
88. Ernest J. Weinrib, Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 50 UCLA L. REV. 621, 626 (2002).
89. Ernest Weinrib, The Special Morality of Tort Law, 34 MCGILL L.J. 403, 410 (1989). In
Professor Weinrib’s view, the foundation of negligence is the formal equality between the parties. Id.
“The equality of the parties is embodied in the objective standard of care, which prevents the terms of
the relationship from being unilaterally determined by the subjective capacities of the doer.” See id. at
410.
90. Ernest J. Weinrib, Causation and Wrongdoing, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 407, 428 (1987).
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adjudication of the plaintiff’s claim that the defendant’s action has wronged
them.
Espousing a different analysis, Professor Jules Coleman suggests that
wrongful harming gives rise to a claim that justice requires the law to repair. 91
Negligence is conduct that is wrongful whether or not the actor is to blame for
the shortcoming in their conduct. The wrongfulness that matters is “[t]he
shortcoming in the doing, not in the doer.” 92 The corrective-justice theories
embrace an objective view of negligence that views unreasonable conduct as
wrongful, but a widely accepted, easily applicable definition of wrongfulness
has not been clearly articulated.
Taking a different approach, the virtue-ethics perspective can be traced
back to Aristotle who focused on virtue as an expression of character rather than
moral compulsion. 93 The focus of this approach is on character traits as a way
of appraising conduct, as opposed to appraising actions according to the actual
subjective motives or character traits of the actor. 94 Virtue ethics “identifies
particular traits as more or less worthy, asks what sort of acts these traits dispose
a person to perform, and then rates acts according to whether or not they are of
the kind a person possessed of worthy character traits would perform.” 95 As
applied to torts, such an approach defines negligence not just by reference to
what is reasonable but also by relying on prudence and carefulness. 96 Acting
prudently requires evaluating how to effectively achieve an end whereas acting
carefully requires thoughtful consideration about the impact of one’s actions on
the safety of others. This approach has not been widely embraced by existing
case law.
These varying formulations of reasonableness support the assertion that
the reasonable-man standard is an imprecise and ambiguous standard.
Reasonableness is a circuitous vessel for incorporating value-laden judgments
into the common law under the guise of objectivity. While the Hand Formula
is not readily found in civil jury instructions, jurors are typically asked whether
a defendant’s actions conformed to the standard of a “reasonable man.” 97 The
haziness about how to define reasonableness is not merely an observation, but
instead it is a critique of the foundation of tort law itself. Whether the goal of
tort law is economic efficiency or corrective justice, one would find it difficult
to evaluate whether tort law is achieving the goal when the goal is ill defined.

91. Jules L. Coleman, Tort Law and the Demands of Corrective Justice, 67 IND. L.J. 349, 369 (1992).
92. Id. at 370.
93. See Kyron Huigens, Virtue and Inculpation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1423, 1465 (1995).
94. Heidi Li Feldman, Prudence, Benevolence, and Negligence: Virtue Ethics and Tort Law, 74 CHI.KENT L. REV. 1431, 1432 (2000).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Sleight of Hand, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1999, 2013–17 (2007).
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The reasonable-man standard is aspirational, but what is being aspired to is not
easily gleaned. The looseness and fluidity of the standard is designed to
reinforce the values of the majority while purporting to be objective.
Liability is thus based not on objective, clear standards but instead on a
subjective standard that has been elucidated by opinions of mainly White male
jurists. 98 As a result, the reasonable-man standard cannot be defended by
arguing that it is objective because it is neither objective nor clear.
2. Inconsistent Variation of the Reasonable-Person Standard
At first blush, liability for a negligence cause of action is premised on the
ability to think and behave reasonably or rationally. 99 Thus, the ability or
capacity for rational thought would seem to be the sine qua non of negligence.
Yet many groups of litigants cannot form rational thoughts. 100 Litigants can fail
to appreciate how their conduct may cause harm to others either because of age
or mental capacity. Litigants suffering from mental illness can lack the capacity
to form rational thoughts, and perfectly sane litigants can experience sudden
emergency situations that impede their ability to make rational decisions. One
would imagine that when applying the reasonable-person standard to situations
in which the defendant lacks the capacity for reason, that reasonableness would
either be judged by taking into account the defendant’s lack of capacity for
reason or that the standard would not yield regardless of the defendant’s
limitations.
In practice, however, the reasonable-person standard actually varies in
application depending on the reason for the lack of capacity. Children who are
under a certain age are typically deemed incapable of negligence. 101 School-age
children are afforded a reasonable-child standard of care, except when they
engage in an inherently dangerous adult activity like driving a motor vehicle. 102
98. See infra Section III.A.
99. MAYO MORAN, RETHINKING THE REASONABLE PERSON: AN EGALITARIAN
RECONSTRUCTION OF THE OBJECTIVE STANDARD 18 (2003).
100. See Johnny Chriscoe & Lisa Lukasik, Re-Examining Reasonableness: Negligence Liability in Adult
Defendants with Cognitive Disabilities, 6 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 1, 76–80 (2015) (noting tort law’s
reluctance to recognize an exception to the “objective reasonableness standard as applied to adult
defendants with cognitive disabilities”).
101. See, e.g., Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739, 745 (Tenn. 1987) (noting that (1) the “Rule of
Sevens” provides that a child under the age of seven has no capacity for negligence, (2) there is “a
rebuttable presumption of no capacity” for a child between the ages of seven and fourteen, and (3)
there is a rebuttable presumption in favor of capacity for a child between the ages of fourteen and the
age of majority); Nielsen ex rel. C.N. v. Bell ex rel. B.B., 370 P.3d 925, 925 (Utah 2016) (holding that
children under the age of five may not be held liable for negligence).
102. See, e.g., Ruiz v. Victory Props., LLC, 107 A.3d 381, 390 (Conn. 2015) (“It definitely has been
established by frequent repetition of the statement that the degree of care required of children is such
care as may reasonably be expected of children of similar age, judgment and experience . . . .” (quoting
Neal v. Shiels, Inc., 347 A.2d 102, 107–08 (Conn. 1974))); Bragan ex rel. Bragan v. Symanzik, 687
N.W.2d 881, 884 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004) (“Minors are required only to exercise ‘that degree of care
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The child standard reflects that children are still developing and should be held
to the standard of a reasonable child of like age, education, experience, and
intelligence. 103
Defendants faced with sudden unforeseeable circumstances also receive
the benefit of an altered standard of care. Courts have recognized that “a
prudent person, when brought face to face with an unexpected danger, may fail
to use the best judgment, may omit some precaution that otherwise might have
been taken, and may not choose the best available method of meeting the
dangers of the situation.” 104 In such situations, the sudden-emergency rule
lessens “the duties applicable to individuals confronted with a sudden
emergency.” 105
In contrast, the reasonable-person standard generally does not make
allowances for adults who have permanent mental deficiencies which prevent
them from forming rational thoughts. 106 The rule that the mentally disabled are
held to the typical reasonable-person standard can be traced back to Weaver v.
Ward 107 and Vaughan v. Menlove, 108 two old English cases. 109 Justice Holmes
justified the common law’s treatment of mental disabilities by noting:
When men live in society, a certain average of conduct, a sacrifice of
individual peculiarities going beyond a certain point, is necessary to the
general welfare. If, for instance, a man is born hasty and awkward, is
always having accidents and hurting himself or his neighbors, no doubt
his congenital defects will be allowed for in the courts of Heaven, but his
which a reasonably careful minor of the age, mental capacity and experience’ of other similarly situated
minors would exercise under the circumstances.” (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted));
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 10 (AM. L. INST.
2010). But see Robinson v. Lindsay, 598 P.2d 392, 393 (Wash. 1979) (recognizing an exception to the
general rule that “a child is held . . . only to the exercise of such degree of care and discretion as is
reasonably to be expected from children of his age” when the child is engaged in certain dangerous
activities “normally . . . for adults only” (quoting Roth v. Union Depot Co., 43 P. 641, 647 (Wash.
1896))); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283A cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 1965) (taking the position
that the special rule for children should not be applied when the child engages in “an activity which is
normally undertaken only by adults, and for which adult qualifications are required”).
103. Lily N. Katz, Tailoring Entrapment to the Adolescent Mind, 18 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y
94, 123–24 (2014) (“Tort law also lays out special considerations for youth; the standard of care for
children is ‘a reasonable person of like age, intelligence, and experience under like circumstances.’”
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283A cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 1965))).
104. 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 200, Westlaw (database updated Feb. 2021).
105. Henson v. Klein, 319 S.W.3d 413, 420 (Ky. 2010).
106. Chriscoe & Lukasik, supra note 100, at 17–20.
107. [1616] 80 Eng. Rep. 284 (K.B.).
108. [1837] 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P.).
109. Weaver, 80 Eng. Rep. at 284 (noting, in dicta that a lunatic would be excused of a trespass);
Vaughan, 132 Eng. Rep. at 492. Most famously in the cause of Vaughan, the court rejected the
defendant’s defense that he did not possess “the highest order of intelligence” and that the standard for
negligence should be whether the defendant used his best judgment. Vaughan, 132 Eng. Rep. at 492.
In so doing, the court noted that such a vague standard would lead to no rule at all. Id. at 493.
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slips are no less troublesome to his neighbors than if they sprang from
guilty neglect. His neighbors accordingly require him, at his proper peril,
to come up to their standard, and the courts which they establish decline
to take his personal equation into account. 110
Most jurisdictions still hold the mentally impaired or insane defendant to
the reasonable-person standard of care, despite their lack of capacity to form
reasonable, rational thoughts. 111 In justifying such a seemingly inequitable
application of the reasonable-person standard, courts have argued: (1) as
between two innocent parties, the one who causes the harm should bear the
loss; 112 (2) it is unfair to the victim not to be compensated when the insane
person can pay; 113 (3) tortfeasors may feign insanity if the standard were
altered; 114 (4) imposing liability encourages the guardian of the insane to
exercise greater care in supervising them; 115 and (5) drawing the line between
mental disability and variations of temperament would be difficult. 116
Unsurprisingly, the treatment of the insane tortfeasors has been criticized in
the scholarly literature. 117
Case law and scholarly commentary suggest that the reasonable-person
standard is inextricably linked to conceptualizing what is normal and
ordinary. 118 Early jurists and legislators were, of course, at one time impetuous
boys. They also could empathize with the emotional stress that one feels when
110. HOLMES, supra note 68, at 108; see also Fleming James, Jr., The Qualities of the Reasonable Man
in Negligence Cases, 16 MO. L. REV. 1, 21 (1951).
111. KEETON ET AL., supra note 58, § 32.
112. See Delahanty v. Hinckley, 799 F. Supp. 184, 187 (D.D.C. 1992); Polmatier v. Russ, 537 A.2d
468, 471 (Conn. 1988); Seals v. Snow, 254 P. 348, 349 (Kan. 1927); Goff v. Taylor, 708 S.W.2d 113,
115 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986); Williams v. Hays, 38 N.E. 449, 450 (N.Y. 1894); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 1965).
113. See Goff, 708 S.W.2d at 115; Hays, 38 N.E. at 450; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 283B cmt. b(3) (AM. L. INST. 1965).
114. See Sforza v. Green Bus Lines, Inc., 268 N.Y.S. 446, 448 (1939) (holding that adopting a
subjective standard for cognitively disabled defendants “would readily induce an influx of simulated or
pretended insanity, predicated upon a great variety of anomalous situations, which would work fraud
and injustice”); Schumann v. Crofoot, 602 P.2d 298, 300 (Or. Ct. App. 1979); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B cmt. b(2) (AM. L. INST. 1965).
115. See McIntyre v. Sholty, 13 N.E. 239, 240 (Ill. 1887); McGuire v. Almy, 8 N.E.2d 760, 762
(Mass. 1937); Schumann, 602 P.2d at 301; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B cmt.
b(4) (AM. L. INST. 1965).
116. See Schumann, 602 P.2d at 300; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 283B cmt. b(1) (AM. L.
INST. 1965).
117. See, e.g., Robert M. Ague, Jr., The Liability of Insane Persons in Tort Actions, 60 DICK. L. REV.
211, 221–24 (1956); Chriscoe & Lukasik, supra note 100, at 17–20; William J. Curran, Tort Liability of
the Mentally Ill and Mentally Deficient, 21 OHIO ST. L.J. 52, 64–74 (1960); Elizabeth J. Goldstein, Asking
the Impossible: The Negligence Liability of the Mentally Ill, 12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 67, 75–
84 (1995); David E. Seidelson, Reasonable Expectations and Subjective Standards in Negligence Law: The
Minor, the Mentally Impaired, and the Mentally Incompetent, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 17, 45–46 (1981).
118. Professor Fridman observed that the reasonable person “is supposed to act in accordance with
what is normal and usual.” See FRIDMAN, supra note 69, at 142.
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faced with unforeseeable emergency circumstances. Both conditions naturally
occur in what they would have viewed as the normal human existence. Since
permanent mental incapacity falls outside of the normal human condition,
insanity has been viewed as an aberration or as abnormal and not deserving of
an altered standard of care. 119
Equating reasonable with ordinary and normal can be linked to not only
treating the mentally ill harshly but also to treating females more harshly.
Professor Mayo Moran opines that using notions of what is normal has created
differing standards of care based on gender. 120 She notes that courts have
deemed actions by boys as nonnegligent by casting “boys will boys” antics as
normal. 121 In contrast, Professor Moran argues that girls are expected to be
cautious and more vigilant. 122 Thus, some judges conflate extra care with normal
behavior for girls, which creates a heightened standard of care that is only
applicable to girls. 123
When viewing the reasonable-person standard as embodying the ideals of
its androcentric, elite creators, it is unsurprising that the mentally ill and girls
would be treated differently and more harshly. As currently conceptualized, the
reasonable-person standard fails to live up to the ideals of neutrality. The
decision to excuse youthful lapses in judgment of impulsive boys but not to
excuse permanent lapses in judgment due to mental incapacity is not
happenstance. Nor is such disparate treatment required. Yet it is tolerated and
perpetuated by deference to patriarchal notions of objectivity and
reasonableness.

119. Treating the mentally ill as the other has led to historic mistreatment of people with mental
illness. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accommodation, and the Politics of
(Disability) Civil Rights Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 825, 850 (2003); Marsha Garrison, The Empire of Illness:
Competence and Coercion in Health-Care Decision Making, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 781, 797 (2007);
Wendy F. Hensel & Gregory Todd Jones, Bridging the Physical-Mental Gap: An Empirical Look at the
Impact of Mental Illness Stigma on ADA Outcomes, 73 TENN. L. REV. 47, 50–52 (2005); U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 6 (1999).
120. Mayo Moran, The Reasonable Person: A Conceptual Biography in Comparative Perspective, 14
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1233, 1246 (2010) (“The judgments repeatedly invoke not what children
commonly do but rather what boys commonly do at play. The judgments ultimately seem to turn on
the sense that what kind of behaviour is normal is sensitive to not only the age but also the gender of
the child.”).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1247 (“[C]ourts generally do require girls to be more cautious to avoid unknown
dangers . . . .”).
123. Id.
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3. Inconsistent Valuation of Women
Because the reasonable-person standard originated from the reasonableman standard, 124 the typical feminist critique argues that changing man to
person did not eradicate the sexism inherent in the standard. 125 Many scholars
have argued that changing reasonable man to reasonable person is not enough
to create a gender-neutral standard. 126 The foundational case law was penned by
White male jurists. 127 Their values and beliefs informed their decision-making,
which created a monolithic common law that has not and cannot be penetrated
by simple linguistic changes. 128
The primacy of reason in American jurisprudence reflects the values of an
androcentric, patriarchal society 129 and the biases of Enlightenment
philosophers. 130 Immanuel Kant proclaimed that women are devoid of the
characteristics necessary for moral action because they act on feelings, not
reason. 131 Arthur Schopenhauer described women as “in every respect
124. See, e.g., Edward Green, The Reasonable Man: Legal Fiction or Psychosocial Reality?, 2 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 241, 241 (1968); Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., The Reasonable Man of Negligence Law: A Health
Report on the “Odious Creature”, 23 OKLA. L. REV. 410, 415 (1970).
125. See, e.g., Diane Klein, Distorted Reasoning: Gender, Risk-Aversion and Negligence Law, 30
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 629, 629 (1997) (“[T]he current understanding of ‘the reasonable man [or person]
standard,’ a central device of tort law, includes an uneasy incorporation of the economists’ notion of
‘risk aversion,’ a deviation from ideally rational ‘risk neutrality,’ that both reflects and reproduces
structures of gender hierarchy and stereotyping.”).
126. See Cahn, supra note 28, at 1405 (“[C]ourts have articulated, as at least a cosmetic
improvement, a reasonable person standard. In application, however, little but the male language of
the standard has changed.” (footnote omitted)); Caroline Forell, Essentialism, Empathy, and the
Reasonable Woman, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 769, 773 (“[T]he reasonable man standard was never gender
neutral. Whether the reasonable person is gender neutral is also doubtful. . . . [T]he change may indeed
be just semantics . . . .”).
127. The American legal system was designed by wealthy White men. Black men and women were
enslaved and considered property. Indigenous peoples were slaughtered and subdued. Those who did
not own property were not qualified to participate in most states. CHARLES AUSTIN BEARD, AN
ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 64–72 (1913)
(analyzing state-by-state property requirements for delegates to the Constitutional Convention). The
homogeneity of the legal profession persisted because law school admission practices favored White
males. See Lucille A. Jewel, Bourdieu and American Legal Education: How Law Schools Reproduce Social
Stratification and Class Hierarchy, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 1155, 1176–77 (2008) (noting that early legal
education programs avoided admitting immigrant, Jewish, Black, and female applicants).
128. See Forell, supra note 126, at 770 (“Until the late 1970s the law’s measure of reasonableness
was openly and exclusively male.”).
129. In 1937, the reasonable man was described by the Harvard Law Review as “the personification
of the social conscience of the court or jury.” Francis H. Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts, 50 HARV. L. REV.
1225, 1225 (1937).
130. See GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH: THE EMBODIED
MIND AND ITS CHALLENGE TO WESTERN THOUGHT 1–7 (1999) (discussing how Western
philosophic tradition ignores the role that the human body and emotion play in the process of
formulating knowledge and ideas).
131. IMMANUEL KANT, OBSERVATIONS ON THE FEELING OF THE BEAUTIFUL AND SUBLIME
78–81 (John T. Goldthwait trans., 1960) (“A woman who has a head full of Greek . . . might as well
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backward, lacking in reason and reflection . . . a kind of middle step between
the child and the man, who is the true human being.” 132 According to Hegel,
women lacked the aptitude for rational thought. 133
As A.P. Herbert once observed in his humorous, but accurate,
commentary on the state of the law: “[I]n all [the] mass of authorities which
bear[] upon this branch of the law there is no single mention of a reasonable
woman.” 134 He went on to note that “such an omission, extending over a century
. . . must be something more than a coincidence.” 135 In 1977, Professor Ronald
Collins published his study of the “reasonable man” standard. 136 He noted that
when courts considered the obligations of women as potential injurers or
victims of injury, they found that women were incapable of reason and treated
like children, as somewhat incompetent in the eyes of the law. 137
Thus, reasonableness was not attributed to women. Instead, it was viewed
as an exclusively masculine trait. Equally troubling, non-White men were also
deemed incapable of rational thought. 138 Under the common law, only White
men were reasonable. A woman’s inability to be reasonable meant that she had
to rely on a man to make decisions of import because a “woman had no legal
existence separate from her husband.” 139 Under the traditional account of
coverture, the identity of a woman merged with her husband’s identity upon
marriage. 140 As explained by William Blackstone in his chapter on The Rights of
Persons:

even have a beard . . . . [A woman’s] philosophy is not to reason, but to sense. . . . I hardly believe the
fair sex is capable of principles . . . .”).
132. Caroline Whitbeck, Theories of Sex Difference, in WOMEN AND PHILOSOPHY: TOWARD A
THEORY OF LIBERATION 54, 55–77 (Carol Gould & M. Wartofsky eds., 1976).
133. GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, HEGEL’S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 263 (T.M. Knox
trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1967).
134. A.P. HERBERT, MISLEADING CASES IN THE COMMON LAW 13 (4th ed. 1928) (emphasis
omitted).
135. Id.
136. Collins, supra note 12, at 311.
137. Id. at 316.
138. For example, since at least 1823, the U.S. Supreme Court has consistently described Native
Americans as “savages.” See, e.g., Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 590 (1823). Similarly,
the Court referred to Native American nations as “the savage tribes” that constitute “an ignorant and
dependent race.” Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 281, 289 (1955); see also 2
COLONEL LANDON CARTER, THE DIARY OF COLONEL LANDON CARTER OF SABINE HALL: 1752–
1778, at 1107 (Jack P. Greene ed., 1965) (“A negroe and a passionate woman are equal as to truth or
falsehood; for neither thinks of what they say.”); MILLS, supra note 29, at 59–60 (1997) (“The
assumption of nonwhite intellectual inferiority was widespread, even if not always tricked out in the
pseudoscientific apparatus that Darwinism would later make possible.”).
139. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872); 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *442 (noting that in the eye of the common law, the personal existence
of the wife was “incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband”).
140. Kristin Collins, When Fathers’ Rights Are Mothers’ Duties: The Failure of Equal Protection in
Miller v. Albright, 109 YALE L.J. 1669, 1682 (2000).
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[H]usband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being or legal
existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is
incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband: under whose
wing, protection, and cover, she performs everything; and is therefore
called in our law-french a feme-covert . . . and her condition during her
marriage is called her coverture. 141
Single women, known as femme-sole, had slightly more autonomy. 142
However, neither single nor married women had a voice in designing American
legal institutions. 143 The absence of a woman’s perspective in the decision to use
reasonableness as the metric and in its application has created a gendered
standard of reasonableness. Thus, reasonable men defined the contours of
acceptable conduct. 144 As such, the decision to rely on reasonableness as the
applicable standard of care was made by men for the benefit of men. 145 These
reasonable men believed that a woman’s autonomy should be legally restrained
because of her tendency to be emotional. 146
A woman’s display of emotion was and still is often characterized as
hysteria. 147 Hysteria is at times something that a woman is afflicted with (akin

141. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 139, at *442.
142. See generally DAVID STEWART, LAW OF HUSBAND AND WIFE AS ESTABLISHED IN
ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES (1885) (describing the various legal realities and duties for
married women and femme sole).
143. In upholding Illinois’s denial of Myra Bradwell’s law license on the basis of sex, Justice
Bradley in his concurrence wrote that
in view of the peculiar characteristics, destiny, and mission of woman, it is within the province
of the legislature to ordain what offices, positions, and callings shall be filled and discharged
by men, and shall receive the benefit of those energies and responsibilities, and that decision
and firmness which are presumed to predominate in the sterner sex.
Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 142 (Bradley, J., concurring).
144. See BEARD, supra note 127, at 64–72.
145. The reasonable man does not reflect the values and impressions of all men. The reasonable
man reflects the worldview of his creators who were White, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant men. See David
Wilkins, Ronit Dinovitzer & Rishi Batra, Urban Law School Graduates in Large Law Firms, 36 SW. U.
L. REV. 433, 442–43 (2007) (explaining that before the 1960s, the law was a bastion for White, AngloSaxon, Protestant males).
146. See Dorothée Sturkenboom, Historicizing the Gender of Emotions: Changing Perceptions in Dutch
Enlightenment Thought, 34 J. SOC. HIST. 55, 55 (2000) (“The idea that women are more emotional than
men appears to be embedded in Western culture, not only in the opinion of the general public, as
expressed down the ages by poets and journalists, but also in science, which has from its beginnings
projected the phenomenon of emotionalism almost exclusively onto the female body.”).
147. See, e.g., Joy Lyneé Maderia, Woman Scorned? Resurrecting Infertile Women’s Decision-Making
Autonomy, 71 MD. L. REV. 339, 367 (2012) (“For hundreds of years, female emotional excesses have
been seen as manifestations of hysteria.”).
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to a disease) 148 or a way of acting (a personality feature or behavior). 149 Hysteria
is derived from the word uterus making it a decidedly feminine condition. 150
The linkage of emotion and hysteria with feminine qualities means that such
traits have not been valued by the law. In fact, masculinity is associated with
salient characteristics that are in opposite, such as restrictive emotionality and
toughness. 151
Masculine values inform how the law defines reasonableness and the
standard of care. Professor Leslie Bender proposes reconceptualizing the
standard of care so that it embraces the “feminine voice.” 152 Professor Bender’s
standard of care is rooted in notions of “interconnectedness, responsibility, and
caring.” 153 In her view, the law should be a positive force that improves social
relationships rather than reinforcing the dominance of those with power.
Professor Bender articulates a standard of care that would be defined as “acting
responsibly towards others to avoid harm, with a concern about the human
consequences of our acts or failure to act.” 154
Professor Diane Klein also argued for a standard of care that embraces
feminine traits or characteristics. Professor Klein argues for a standard of care
that is based on the female tendency to be risk averse. 155 Professor Klein uses
the language of law, economics, and social science research to argue for a

148. See, e.g., Gannon v. S.S. Kresge Co., 157 A. 541, 541 (Conn. 1931) (noting that the plaintiff
“had suffered pain, nervousness, insomnia, and hysteria, and as a result had suffered a miscarriage”);
Battel v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 153 Ill. App. 210, 211 (1910) (describing the female plaintiff’s injuries
as “a scalp wound from an inch and three-quarters to two inches in length at the prominent part of the
back of the head, and claims to have suffered also internal injuries causing hysteria and other troubles”).
149. See, e.g., People v. Smith, 91 N.E.3d 489, 502 (Ill. 2017) (noting that defense counsel argued
that female witness was “hysterical and crying through her whole testimony” and that “her testimony
was ‘not probative,’ but rather ‘incredibly inflammatory’ and ‘way over the top’”); People v. Cator, 159
A.D.3d 1583, 1583 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018) (holding that that the actions of the “hysterical” woman,
without more, did not provide the deputy with reasonable suspicion to justify the stop of the vehicle).
150. Ada McVean, The History of Hysteria, MCGILL OFF. FOR SCI. & SOC’Y (July 31,
2017), https://www.mcgill.ca/oss/article/history-quackery/history-hysteria [https://perma.cc/9EMNZAUS].
151. For example, Levant and colleagues have identified salient characteristics of masculinity
which include avoidance of femininity (eschewing traits and activities associated with women),
negativity toward sexual minorities (for example, homophobia), self-reliance, toughness (displaying
physical and emotional strength or resilience), dominance (taking charge or exhibiting power),
importance of sex (being driven by sexual desire and conquest), and restrictive emotionality
(suppressing emotions that may be considered weak, exhibiting stoicism). Ronald F. Levant, Rosalie J.
Hall & Thomas J. Rankin, Male Role Norms Inventory–Short Form (MRNI-SF): Development,
Confirmatory Factor Analytic Investigation of Structure, and Measurement Invariance Across Gender, 60 J.
COUNSELING PSYCH. 228, 228–37 (2013).
152. See, e.g., Leslie Bender, A Lawyer’s Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3,
32 (1988).
153. Id. at 31.
154. Id. at 32.
155. Klein, supra note 125, at 651–59.
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“reasonable risk-averse person” standard of care. 156 Professor Klein argues that
the social science literature clearly establishes that, on average, women tend to
be more risk averse than men. 157 In her view, the absolute and relative risk
aversion of women and girls not only distinguishes them from men and boys
but can also form the basis of a superior standard of liability for negligence.
Professor Klein argues for a universal standard that embraces the feminine
approach to risk-taking. 158 Thus, the reasonable, risk-averse-person standard has
the added benefit of demarginalizing attributes associated with women.
In sum, the reasonable-man standard is a gendered standard. Linguistically
changing reasonable man to reasonable person cannot erase the fact that the
standard embodies the values of its creators. The reasonable man was born of
creators who believed that women and non-White men lacked the capacity for
reason. 159 Their biases are woven into the fabric of the common law.
B.

Reasonableness in Criminal Law

Just as in tort law, reasonableness permeates many aspects of criminal law.
As Professor George Fletcher notes, “In criminal law, we talk incessantly of
reasonable provocation, reasonable mistake, reasonable force, and reasonable
risk.” 160 In most instances, reasonableness as well as its personification, a
“reasonable person,” occurs throughout the criminal law as a standard for wholly
or partly exculpating actors of criminal responsibility. A few examples where
the reasonable person surfaces in criminal law include involuntary manslaughter
and negligent homicide, 161 self-defense, 162 the defenses of coercion and
duress, 163 necessity, 164 and rape. 165 Reasonableness is at the center of every

156. Id. at 663.
157. See Gerald A. Hudgens & Linda Torsani Fatkin, Sex Differences in Risk Taking: Repeated
Sessions on a Computer-Simulated Task, 119 J. PSYCH. 197, 197 (1985) (concluding men generally take
more risks than women); Irmtraud Seeborg, William Lafollette & James Belohlav, An Exploratory
Analysis of Effect of Sex on Shift in Choices, 46 PSYCH. REPS. 499, 499–500 (1980) (supporting view of
females as stereotypically conservative regarding risk); David A. Ward, Karen Seccombe & Robert
Bendel, Influenceability of Sex Differences Under Conditions of Risk Taking, 115 J. GEN. PSYCH. 247, 248
(1988) (positing that females are more reluctant risk-takers).
158. See Klein, supra note 125, at 667.
159. This Articles focuses on how the exclusion of women shaped how the law defines
reasonableness. Yet the status quo conceptions of reasonableness also exclude the voices of people of
color. A discussion about race is beyond the scope of this Article but worthy of further exploration.
160. George P. Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98 HARV. L. REV. 949, 949 (1985).
161. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 210.3–.4 (AM. L. INST. 1980).
162. See, e.g., State v. Norman, 324 N.C. 253, 259, 378 S.E.2d 8, 12 (1989).
163. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 (AM. L. INST. 1985) (stating that the defense is
available if a “person of reasonable firmness in his situation would have been unable to resist”).
164. See, e.g., Nelson v. State, 597 P.2d 977, 980 (Alaska 1979) (holding that consideration must
be given to “harm reasonably foreseeable at the time, rather than the harm that actually occurs”).
165. See, e.g., People v. Stitely, 108 P.3d 182, 208 (Cal. 2005) (holding that a person is not guilty
of rape if he believes honestly and reasonably that the woman consented).
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criminal case: the criminal law standard for burden of proof is “beyond a
reasonable doubt.” 166 Like in tort, the ramifications of having such ill-defined
standards lead to subjective judgments masquerading as objective standards.
1. Defining Reasonable Doubt
The standard of criminal proof beyond a reasonable doubt is venerated as
a core pillar of criminal law assuring that the state will not punish the innocent
to more easily ensnare the guilty. 167 Although the words “reasonable doubt” are
integral to criminal cases, there is tremendous variation in how courts explain
the reasonable doubt requirement to the jury. One of the variations is simply
to not define it. 168 The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals went so far as to
hold that any attempt by a trial judge to define reasonable doubt automatically
constitutes reversible error. 169 In declining to define the term, the Illinois
Supreme Court noted that “[i]t is doubtful whether any better definition of the
term can be found than the words themselves.” 170 Such an approach was blessed
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Victor v. Nebraska, 171 which held that “the
Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable doubt nor
requires them to do so as a matter of course.” 172
166. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment “protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt”).
167. For example, in Winship, Justice Brennan eloquently wrote,
The reasonable-doubt standard plays a vital role in the American scheme of criminal
procedure. It is a prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual error.
The standard provides concrete substance for the presumption of innocence—that bedrock
“axiomatic and elementary” principle whose “enforcement lies at the foundation of the
administration of our criminal law.”
Id. at 363 (citations omitted) (quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895)).
168. For example, Illinois does not define “beyond a reasonable doubt.” The Special Illinois
Supreme Court Committee on Pattern Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases notes that the Illinois
Pattern Jury Instructions inform criminal trial courts to not provide a definition instruction, stating:
“Reasonable doubt is a term which needs no elaboration and we have so frequently discussed the futility
of attempting to define it that we might expect the practice to be discontinued.” ILL. PATTERN CRIM.
JURY INSTRS. 2.05 (approved December 8, 2011) (quoting People v. Malmenato, 150 N.E.2d 806, 811
(Ill. 1958)).
169. See Pannell v. State, 640 P.2d 568, 570 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982); see also United States v.
Headspeth, 852 F.2d 753, 755 (4th Cir. 1988) (“We have frequently admonished district courts not to
attempt to define reasonable doubt in their instructions to the jury . . . .”), abrogated on other grounds,
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990).
170. People v. Barkas, 99 N.E. 698, 703 (Ill. 1912); see also United States v. Hall, 854 F.2d 1036,
1038 (7th Cir. 1988) (“[A]t best, definitions of reasonable doubt are unhelpful to a jury, and, at worst,
they have the potential to impair a defendant’s constitutional right to have the government prove each
element beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
171. 511 U.S. 1 (1994).
172. Id. at 5; see also Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954) (“Attempts to explain the
term ‘reasonable doubt’ do not usually result in making it any clearer to the minds of the jury . . . .”
(quoting Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304, 312 (1880))).
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Among those jurisdictions that define the standard, several themes
emerge. Some jurisdictions direct jurors to use their “common sense” in
applying the standard. 173 Some jurisdictions define reasonable doubt by
referencing the level of conviction. For instance, California defines reasonable
doubt as
not a mere possible doubt; because everything relating to human affairs
is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case,
which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence,
leaves the minds of jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel
an abiding conviction of the truth of the charge. 174
Other jurisdictions formulate a definition that requires moral certainty. 175 Still
other jurisdictions frame the issue by asking whether jurors would hesitate if it
were a matter of importance in their lives. For example, Pennsylvania courts
define reasonable doubt as “a doubt that would cause a reasonably careful and
sensible person to hesitate before acting upon a matter of importance in his or
her own affairs.” 176
The common belief that beyond reasonable doubt is an exacting standard
requiring a high degree of certainty has been called into question by several
empirical studies. In a 1991 study, mock jurors watched a video reenactment of

173. See, e.g., ALASKA PATTERN CRIM. JURY INSTRS. 1.06 (revised 2019) (“A reasonable doubt is
based on reason and common sense. A defendant must never be found guilty based on mere suspicion,
speculation, or guesswork.”). Some states do not define “beyond a reasonable doubt.” See, e.g., United
States v. Kieffer, 681 F.3d 1143, 1157 (10th Cir. 2012) (approving of a jury instruction that defined
reasonable doubt as “a doubt based upon reason and common sense after careful and impartial
consideration of all the evidence in the case”). An often-cited treatise on federal pattern jury
instructions defines reasonable doubt as
a doubt based upon reason. It is doubt that a reasonable person has after carefully weighing
all of the evidence. It is a doubt that would cause a reasonable person to hesitate to act in a
matter of importance in his or her personal life. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt must,
therefore, be proof of a convincing character that a reasonable person would not hesitate to
rely upon in making an important decision.
1 LEONARD B. SAND, JOHN S. SIFFERT, WALTER P. LOUGHLIN, STEVEN A. REISS, STEVEN W.
ALLEN & JED S. RAKOFF, MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL, Instr. 4–2 (2020).
174. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1096 (2021); see also MO. STD. CRIM. JURY INSTRS. 302.04 (1987);
State v. Henson, 876 S.W.2d 31, 33 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that the definition of reasonable
doubt is constitutionally sound). Similarly, the Florida Standard Jury Instruction pertaining to
reasonable doubt describes a reasonable doubt as “not a mere possible doubt, a speculative, imaginary
or forced doubt.” FLA. STD. CRIM. JURY INSTRS. 3.7 (1997).
175. See, e.g., State v. Desrosiers, 559 A.2d 641, 645 (R.I. 1989) (“Proof beyond a reasonable doubt
may be properly equated to proof of guilt to a moral certainty.”). Massachusetts also approves of the
use of moral certainty when describing reasonable doubt, as long as additional language is provided
that emphasizes that such a standard is very high. See Commonwealth v. Pinckney, 644 N.E.2d 973,
976 (Mass. 1995); Commonwealth v. Gagliardi, 638 N.E.2d 20, 25 (Mass. 1994).
176. E.g., PA. STD. CRIM. JURY INSTRS. 7.01 (2016).
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a murder trial involving an insanity defense. 177 The participants were then
assigned to groups to receive instructions on the different burdens of proof. 178
Despite the different burdens, there was not a statistically significant difference
in conviction rates among the groups. 179
Professor Reid Hastie summarizes over fifteen different empirical studies
of the reasonable doubt standard in experimental trial settings. 180 One of the
largest of these studies asked judges, laypeople, and students to directly state
what degree of certainty they would require for the reasonable doubt
standard. 181 The subjects varied widely, requiring certainty ranging from 0.92%
certainty to 0.51%. 182 In contrast, in a 2007 study, test participants set the
conviction threshold at a mere sixty-three percent chance that the defendant
was guilty, 183 and in 2014, researchers found that laypersons were willing to
convict at a sixty-eight percent probability of guilt. 184
In a study designed to simulate juror deliberations, Professors Irwin
Horowitz and Laird Kilpatrick compared interpretations of reasonable doubt in
the context of a hypothetical murder case where the strength of the evidence
was manipulated as weak or strong. 185 They used four different definitions of
reasonable doubt in the jury instructions: firmly convinced, moral certainty,
does not waiver or vacillate, and real doubt. 186 In addition, some subjects
received instructions that left the standard undefined. 187 Mock jurors grouped
into six-person juries provided their interpretations of reasonable doubt at both
the pre- and post-deliberation stages. 188 Professors Horowitz and Kilpatrick
found that the most stringent interpretations of reasonable doubt occurred

177. James R.P. Ogloff, A Comparison of Insanity Defense Standards on Juror Decision Making, 15 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 509, 514 (1991).
178. Id. at 515.
179. Id. at 516.
180. Reid Hastie, Algebraic Models of Juror Decision Processes, in INSIDE THE JUROR: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION MAKING 101–06 (Reid Hastie ed., 1993).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 106.
183. Daniel B. Wright & Melanie Hall, How a “Reasonable Doubt” Instruction Affects Decisions of
Guilt, 29 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 91, 96 (2007).
184. Svein Magnussen, Dag Erik Eilertsen, Karl Halvor Teigen & Ellen Wessel, The Probability of
Guilt in Criminal Cases: Are People Aware of Being ‘Beyond Reasonable Doubt’?, 28 APPLIED COGNITIVE
PSYCH. 196, 199 (2014) (“For police investigators, laypersons attending jury deliberations, and judges,
the corresponding subjective probabilities were 61%, 68%, and 83%, respectively.”).
185. Irwin A. Horowitz & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, A Concept in Search of a Definition: The Effects of
Reasonable Doubt Instructions on Certainty of Guilt Standards and Jury Verdicts, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
655, 659, 661 (1996).
186. Id. at 660–61.
187. Id. at 661.
188. Id. at 662–63.
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under the “firmly convinced” instruction, 189 while the most lax interpretations
varied across conditions. 190
A recent 2019 study asked mock jurors to read one of four criminal cases:
battery with weak evidence of guilt, battery with strong evidence, trespass with
weak evidence, and trespass with strong evidence. 191 Participants were assigned
to one of three groups, each of which was instructed to apply a different burden
of proof. 192 The different burdens were preponderance of the evidence, clear
and convincing, and beyond a reasonable doubt. 193 Once again—regardless of
the case type (battery or trespass) or strength of evidence (weak or strong)—
the three different burdens of proof did not produce significantly different
verdict patterns. 194
Taken together, the empirical evidence suggests that jurors require
inordinately differing levels of confidence when deciding whether to convict
someone under the reasonable doubt standard. Their assessment of what
constitutes reasonable doubt is seemingly subjective. Therefore, although
reasonable suggests objectivity, in actuality, it masks the subjective nature of
the standard and is applied inconsistently.
2. Inconsistent Variation of the Reasonable-Person Standard
Reasonableness in criminal law is woven into the statutory elements of
crimes and defenses. For example, voluntary manslaughter is cloaked in
assessments of reasonableness. In Georgia, a state that follows the common law
approach, voluntary manslaughter is appropriate when a person “causes the
death of another human being under circumstances which would otherwise be
murder and if he acts solely as the result of a sudden, violent, and irresistible
passion resulting from serious provocation sufficient to excite such passion in a
reasonable person . . . .” 195 The definition of “negligently” in the Model Penal
Code (“MPC”) includes the following: “the actor’s failure to perceive [the risk]
. . . involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person
would observe in the actor’s situation.” 196 Similarly, the MPC provides for a
reduced grade of homicide when what would otherwise be murder was
“committed under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for
189. Id. at 663–65.
190. “Moral certainty” resulted in more convictions with lower confidence levels in the strong
evidence and pre and postdeliberation conditions, while “waiver and vacillate” resulted in more
convictions with lower confidence in the weak evidence and post-deliberation condition. Id. at 662–65.
191. Lawrence T. White & Michael D. Cicchini, Is Reasonable Doubt Self-Defining?, 64 VILL. L.
REV. 1, 2 (2019).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-2(a) (LEXIS through the 2020 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.).
196. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d) (AM. L. INST. 1962).
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which there is reasonable explanation or excuse.” 197 Reasonableness “shall be
determined from the viewpoint of a person in the actor’s situation under the
circumstances as he believes them to be.” 198
In heterosexual relationships, men who kill their wives can avail
themselves of voluntary manslaughter statutes, but women who kill their
husbands often cannot because of the gender bias inherent in how
reasonableness is defined. 199 Although the law provides some legal cover to
those who reasonably react with violence in the heat of passion, the decision to
make such conduct less blameworthy is based upon the law codifying masculine
behavior as the norm and not based upon how people universally respond to
provoking events. 200 A reasonable woman might not immediately respond with
a violent reaction. Her anger might slowly build, but the law does not excuse
behavior that stems from buildup over time.
In addition to apprising the reasonableness of conduct through a gendered
lens, inconsistencies abound when delineating which characteristics of
individual defendants are included when evaluating reasonableness. The MPC’s
commentaries attempt to provide further guidance about what factors may be
considered when deciding whether a defendant was reasonable:
If the actor were blind or if he had just suffered a blow or experienced a
heart attack, these would certainly be facts to be considered in a judgment
involving criminal liability, as they would be under traditional law. But
the heredity, intelligence or temperament of the actor would not be held
material in judging negligence, and could not be without depriving the
criterion of all its objectivity. 201
Similarly, variations are numerous with respect to self-defense. In most
jurisdictions, a defendant who is not the aggressor in an encounter “is justified
in using a reasonable amount of force against another person if she honestly and
reasonably believes that (1) she is in imminent or immediate danger of unlawful
bodily harm from her aggressor, and (2) the use of such force is necessary to
avoid the danger.” 202 In deciding whether the defendant’s belief was reasonable,

197. Id. § 210.3(1)(b).
198. Id.
199. See Wendy Keller, Note, Disparate Treatment of Spouse Murder Defendants, 6 S. CAL. REV. L.
& WOMEN’S STUD. 255, 262 (1996) (arguing current legal doctrines are “grounded in traditional
notions of men’s crimes” which makes it hard to accommodate females who commit crimes that are
typically associated with men).
200. Elise J. Percy, Joseph L. Hoffmann & Steven J. Sherman, “Sticky Metaphors” and the Persistence
of the Traditional Voluntary Manslaughter Doctrine, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 383, 393–94 (2011).
201. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. 4 (AM. L. INST. 1962).
202. CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND FEAR IN THE
CRIMINAL COURTROOM 127 (2003).
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courts differ in their approach, from applying a purely subjective test 203 to
applying a reasonableness test that factors in some of the actor’s physical
attributes and background facts. 204 Confusion reigns with respect to which
subjective traits of the defendant should be evaluated by the jury when
ascertaining reasonableness. 205 Thus, reliance on reasonableness leads to neither
objective nor consistent standards.
3. Inconsistent Valuation of Women
There is robust scholarly literature discussing the impact of race and
gender on the application of criminal law. 206 While a comprehensive discussion
of the intersection of race and gender in criminal law is beyond the scope of this
Article, a limited discussion is warranted. Self-defense and rape law are two
areas in which reasonableness determines guilt or innocence. Given the
centrality of reasonableness to criminal cases, it is troubling that its conceptions
are dominated by the masculine perspective. The hegemonic masculine identity
in American culture is that of a straight, affluent, White male. 207 Masculine
notions of reasonableness are enshrined in how it is defined because the early
jurists were White males.
As such, much scholarship has been written about the failure of criminal
law to respond to crimes against women. 208 Adapting existing paradigms to
203. E.g., State v. Zajac, 767 N.W.2d 825, 830 (N.D. 2009) (“A person’s conduct is excused if he
believes that the facts are such that his conduct is necessary and appropriate . . . even though his belief
is mistaken.”); State v. Haines, 860 N.E.2d 91, 97 (Ohio 2006) (“Ohio has a subjective test to
determine whether a defendant properly acted in self-defense . . . .”).
204. E.g., MODAL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. 4 (AM. L. INST. 1962). The MPC further notes,
however, that “[t]here is an inevitable ambiguity in ‘situation.’ . . . The Code is not intended to displace
discriminations of this kind, but rather to leave the issue to the courts”. Id.
205. See Michael Vitiello, Defining the Reasonable Person in the Criminal Law: Fighting the Lernaean
Hydra, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1435, 1447 (2010) (“[C]ourts have not reached consistent positions
on drawing the line when faced with a request for an instruction that individualizes the reasonable
person.”).
206. See, e.g., Katharine K. Baker, Gender and Emotion in Criminal Law, 28 HARV. J.L. & GENDER
447, 447 (2005) (explaining that criminal law excuses masculine emotional outbursts but fails to provide
a framework for recognizing women’s emotional experiences); Angela J. Davis, Benign Neglect of Racism
in the Criminal Justice System, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1660, 1685–86 (1996) (arguing that “the ferreting out
of racial bias in the criminal justice system whether willful or unintentional, occasional or routine,
should be a priority in a civilized and just society. . . . The focus should be on how to discover and
eliminate racial bias in the criminal justice system, wherever and whenever it exists”).
207. Don Sabo, Terry A. Kupers & Willie London, Gender and the Politics of Punishment, in PRISON
MASCULINITIES 5 (Don Sabo, Terry A. Kupers & Willie London eds., 2001).
208. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 21, at 1038–39 (arguing that public health paradigms are better
suited to decreasing the prevalence of rape than criminal law reforms); Aya Gruber, Rape, Feminism,
and the War on Crime, 84 WASH. L. REV. 581, 584–85 (2009) [hereinafter Gruber, Rape, Feminism, and
the War on Crime] (contending that rape shield laws are ineffective); Valerie Smith, Split Affinities: The
Case of Interracial Rape, in CONFLICTS IN FEMINISM 275–76 (Marianne Hirsch & Evelyn Fox Keller
eds., 1990) (“The relative invisibility of black women victims of rape also reflects the differential value
of women’s bodies in capitalist societies. To the extent that rape is constructed as a crime against the

99 N.C. L. REV. 1027 (2021)

2021]

THE EMOTIONAL WOMAN

1057

provide redress has been challenging and of limited efficacy because the existing
law regulates conduct from a masculine perspective. 209 For example, selfdefense frameworks have been criticized for adopting androcentric responses to
aggression and physical threats. North Carolina is an illustrative example
because it frames the elements in explicitly masculine terms. 210 A defendant is
entitled to an instruction on perfect self-defense as an excuse for a killing when
evidence is presented tending to show that, at the time of the killing,
(1) it appeared to defendant and he believed it to be necessary to kill the
deceased in order to save himself from death or great bodily harm; and
(2) defendant’s belief was reasonable in that the circumstances as they
appeared to him at the time were sufficient to create such a belief in the
mind of a person of ordinary firmness; and (3) defendant was not the
aggressor in bringing on the affray, i.e., he did not aggressively and
willingly enter into the fight without legal excuse or provocation; and (4)
defendant did not use excessive force, i.e., did not use more force than
was necessary or reasonably appeared to him to be necessary under the
circumstances to protect himself from death or great bodily harm. 211
In State v. Norman, 212 the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the
trial court correctly refused to allow the jury to consider whether Judy Norman
killed her husband in self-defense. 213 During their marriage, Judy’s husband,
J.T. Norman, engaged in a horrific pattern of abuse. 214 He regularly beat her
using his fists and other objects that he had at hand. 215 He burned Judy with
cigarettes and knocked her down the stairs, causing a miscarriage. 216 J.T.
demanded that Judy work as a prostitute, made her sleep on the floor, and forced
her to eat dog food. 217 For days, J.T. had beaten Judy continuously, threatening
to maim and kill her. 218 When J.T. fell asleep, Judy shot him three times in the
property of privileged white men, crimes against less valuable women—women of color, working-class
women, and lesbians, for example—mean less or mean differently than those against white women
from the middle and upper classes.”).
209. For example, criminal law has failed to capture the full experience of women who are caught
in a cycle of domestic violence. Women experience domestic violence as a cyclical pattern of violence
and humiliation but criminal penalties for domestic violence are based on the incorrect notion that each
incident of violence is distinct. See, e.g., Tania Tetlow, Criminalizing “Private” Torture, 58 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 183, 186–88, 201 (2016) (explaining that “[c]riminal law does not recognize domestic violence
as a pattern crime and instead treats it as individual, isolated incidents” and advocating for a torture
statute to address domestic violence).
210. See, e.g., State v. Norris, 303 N.C. 526, 530, 279 S.E.2d 570, 572–73 (1981).
211. State v. Gappins, 320 N.C. 64, 70–71, 357 S.E.2d 654, 659 (1987).
212. 324 N.C. 253, 378 S.E.2d 8 (1989).
213. Id. at 254, 378 S.E.2d at 9.
214. Id. at 255, 378 S.E.2d at 9–10.
215. Id. at 255, 378 S.E.2d at 10.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 256–57, 378 S.E.2d at 10–11.
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back of the head while he lay sleeping. 219 The jury was not instructed on the law
of self-defense because the court determined that Judy had “ample time” to find
other ways to protect herself. 220 The court concluded that the evidence did not
give rise to actual or reasonable belief that Judy faced an imminent threat or
needed to use deadly force. 221 Ultimately, a jury conviction for voluntary
manslaughter and a six-year term of imprisonment were affirmed. 222
Although the exact wording differs from state to state, traditional selfdefense doctrine includes a necessity requirement (the defendant must have
honestly and reasonably believed it was necessary to use the amount of force
used), an imminence requirement (the defendant must have honestly and
reasonably believed that an unlawful attack was imminent), and a
proportionality requirement (the defendant must only use the amount of force
which is warranted in relation to the threatened force). 223 The reasonableness
standard assumes equality of all individuals, thereby obscuring and ignoring the
social reality of differentiation and inequality. Women are punished when they
strike back after years of abuse, but men’s violence is excused when they react
impulsively and violently. 224 The paradigm governing self-defense poses
significant challenges for female defendants like Judy Norman. First, the crux
of self-defense lies with proving the objective reasonableness of the defendant’s
belief that the use of lethal force was both necessary and imminent. North
Carolina, like many jurisdictions, requires an objective determination of
reasonableness that does not allow for a subjectivized inquiry to recognize the
defendant’s own unique personal experiences, such as those of a battered
spouse. 225
Additionally, the “temporal proximity” between the deceased’s threat of
violence and the abused defendant’s use of deadly force presents a significant
hurdle, with the court requiring that the threat be imminent or immediate. It is
not uncommon for victims of abuse to first exhibit symptoms of depression and
desperation and react violently only after a lapse of time between the last
battering incident and the killing. 226 Additionally, when viewing the domestic
219. Id. at 261, 378 S.E.2d at 13.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 261–62, 378 S.E.2d at 13.
222. Id. at 253–54, 378 S.E.2d at 9.
223. See Richard A. Rosen, On Self-Defense, Imminence, and Women Who Kill Their Batterers, 71 N.C.
L. REV. 371, 378 (1993) (explaining that traditional self-defense doctrine requires that one must be in
danger of imminent deadly harm before one is justified in using deadly force in defense).
224. For example, in critiquing the heat of passion excuse, Professor Victoria Nourse notes that
women were the defendant in only three heat of passion cases, while men routinely received reduced
sentences for killing their intimate partners or their lovers. See Victoria Nourse, Passion’s Progress:
Modern Law Reform and the Provocation Defense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331, 1375–77, 1414 (1997).
225. See State v. Gappins, 320 N.C. 64, 70–71, 357 S.E.2d 654, 659 (1987).
226. See Kit Kinports, So Much Activity, So Little Change: A Reply to the Critics of Battered Women’s
Self-Defense, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 155, 181–83 (2004) (explaining that battered women may
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violence victim’s actions in light of their abuse, it is not irrational for them to
fear renewed violence in the near future, even in circumstances where the threat
of deadly force against them was not imminent. 227 Yet, like Judy Norman,
defendants claiming self-defense in these situations are not typically successful
because courts narrowly define imminent. 228 Finally, the proportionality
between the violence threatened and the violence used in self-defense raises a
specific problem for abused women, as courts grapple with whether their often
smaller stature permits them to use a weapon when it would not be appropriate
for a man to use one in similar circumstances. 229 Ultimately, the elements of
self-defense were designed by men to excuse the reasonable conduct of men.
Women were not drafters of the common law, and their perspective is not
reflected in many statutory formulations of self-defense.
Similarly, the criminal elements of rape law and their application reflect
the masculine point of view. Rape law has long been the subject of feminist
scholarship. 230 It has its roots in the historical practice of treating women as the
property of males. In ancient Babylonian and Mosaic societies, rape was
codified as a property crime and thus viewed as a crime committed against
fathers and husbands rather than women. 231 During these early times, rape laws
sought to protect the interests of men as it related to their women, whose value
was derived from their chastity and pureness. 232 As such, rape was treated as an
affront to male interests. Early English rape law reflected an androcentric view
of rape by compensating the husband or father in situations where the woman
was taken against her will or when the woman went willingly with her

feel that they can properly protect themselves only once the abuse has stopped, such as when the abuser
is asleep).
227. See id. at 180 (“[R]esearch shows that battered women tend to become hypersensitive to their
abuser’s behavior and to the signs that predict a beating.”).
228. See id. at 183–85.
229. State v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548, 558–59 (Wash. 1977) (en banc) (recognizing differences in
size and strength as relevant to self-defense elements).
230. See, e.g., SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 208–09
(1975) (explaining how rape is an act of sexual domination); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD
A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 172 (1989) (describing rape as “not an isolated event or moral
transgression or individual interchange gone wrong but an act of terrorism and torture within a
systemic context of group subjection, like lynching”); Michelle J. Anderson, All-American Rape, 79 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 625, 625 (2005); Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1090 (1986); Aya Gruber, A
“Neo-Feminist” Assessment of Rape and Domestic Violence Law Reform, 15 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 583,
585 (2012); Deborah Tuerkheimer, Judging Sex, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1461, 1466 (2012).
231. In ancient Babylonia, a married woman who was raped by someone other than her husband
was forced to share the punishment with her attacker—both were bound and thrown into the river. See
2 THE BABYLONIAN LAWS 51–53 (G.R. Driver & John C. Miles trans., 1955).
232. See Julia Quilter, From Raptus to Rape: A History of the ‘Requirements’ of Resistance and Injury, 2
LAW & HIST. 89, 101 (2015) (noting that the rape laws “were designed to protect property interests;
the woman’s wishes (and her violation or otherwise) were not the most important aspect of the
offence”).
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ravisher. 233 Early American rape law reflected similar priorities. Rape law
applied to White women who were raped because the destruction of their
chastity amounted to destruction of male property. 234 Women of color were
either statutorily denied protection against rape, or prosecutors used their
discretion and did not prosecute cases when a woman of color was the victim. 235
The law traditionally has defined the crime of rape as an act of sexual
intercourse accomplished by a man with a woman who is not his wife, by force,
and against her will. 236 In essence, rape requires penetration, force, and lack of
consent. 237 Courts and legislatures formulated elements of rape that reflected a
preoccupation with potential false rape allegations, resulting in standards that
reflect not only a belief that women lie but also that women vacillate between a
desire for sex and guilt. 238 The resistance requirement is uniquely important
because it is intertwined with defining and proving two of the three articulated
elements of rape—force and nonconsent. 239
233. See id.
234. Zanita E. Fenton, An Essay on Slavery’s Hidden Legacy: Social Hysteria and Structural
Condonation of Incest, 55 HOW. L.J. 319, 332 (2012) (“Rape for white women was originally offense
trespass against the property interest of the father or husband as owner of the woman violated.”).
235. Jeffrey J. Pokorak, Rape as a Badge of Slavery: The Legal History of, and Remedies for, Prosecutorial
Race-of-Victim Charging Disparities, 7 NEV. L.J. 1, 7–8 (2006) (“The history of rape prosecution has
always been inextricably intertwined with the history of race relations in this county. . . . Raping a
Black woman was not a crime for the majority of this Nation’s history. First, the rape of a Black woman
was simply not criminalized. And even when there was an argument that a statute was race neutral as
to victimization, prosecutorial inaction and Court holdings made clear the lack of recourse for Black
women who were raped.” (footnotes omitted)).
236. At English common law, rape was defined as “the carnal knowledge of a woman forcibly and
against her will,” and included three basic elements: vaginal intercourse, force, and nonconsent. See 3
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *3–4.
237. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 (AM. L. INST. 1985).
238. See, e.g., Comment, Forcible and Statutory Rape: An Exploration of the Operation and Objectives
of the Consent Standard, 62 YALE L.J. 55, 67–68 (1952) (“[A] woman’s need for sexual satisfaction may
lead to the unconscious desire for forceful penetration, the coercion serving neatly to avoid the guilt
feelings which might arise after willing participation. . . . Where such an attitude of ambivalence exists,
the woman may, nonetheless, exhibit behavior which would lead the fact finder to conclude that she
opposed the act. To illustrate: . . . the anxiety resulting from this conflict of needs may cause her to
flee from the situation of discomfort, either physically by running away, or symbolically by retreating
to such infantile behavior as crying. The scratches, flight, and crying constitute admissible and
compelling evidence of non-consent. But the conclusion of rape in this situation may be inconsistent
with the meaning of the consent standard and unjust to the man. . . . [F]airness to the male suggests a
conclusion of not guilty, despite signs of aggression, if his act was not contrary to the woman’s
formulated wishes.” (footnotes omitted)). This comment is cited, and its influence is apparent, both in
in the MPC provisions adopted in the 1950s and in later comments to the provisions. See MODEL
PENAL CODE § 213.1 (AM. L. INST. 1980).
239. See Estrich, supra note 230, at 1107–08 (discussing how the force requirement is used to
determine “whether the force was sufficient to overcome a reasonable women’s will to resist”).
Requiring both elements ensures that rape law is not overinclusive. See Ann T. Spence, Note, A
Contract Reading of Rape Law: Redefining Force To Include Coercion, 37 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 57,
61 (2003) (“[T]he fear of an overbroad definition of rape—one that criminalizes too much sex—has
motivated the use of both elements.”).
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In defining force, courts must distinguish between the force that is
incidental to intercourse 240 and the force that satisfies the criminal element.
Physical force per se is not criminalized, but forcible compulsion, defined as
force used to overcome a woman’s resistance, is prohibited. 241 The resistance
standard focuses not on the consent of the woman involved but on her actual
conduct, namely her resistance or lack of it. 242 At common law, the prosecution
was required “to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the woman resisted her
assailant to the utmost of her physical capacity to prove that an act of sexual
intercourse was rape.” 243 Thus, the law required that the victim’s conduct be
scrutinized instead of focusing on the offender’s conduct.
This standard clearly protected men’s interests over providing redress for
women who were raped. The standard reflects the belief that a woman should
protect her chastity with her life. It also provides legal protection for men who
act on their sexual desires by requiring an inquiry into whether the woman
sufficiently resisted instead of requiring an analysis of the man’s conduct.
Relatedly, under such an androcentric standard, securing a rape conviction is
incredibly difficult.
Most states have dropped the utmost resistance requirement in favor of a
less stringent standard commonly referred to as “reasonable resistance” or
simply “resistance.” 244 Only Louisiana continues to require the common law
standard of “utmost resistance.” 245 Yet even reasonable resistance is a high bar
when reasonableness is defined by men. It is not uncommon for women to
submit when they believe that resistance is futile. 246 Tonic immobility is a
natural response to trauma that occurs in animals and humans alike. 247 It is
characterized by physical immobility, muscular rigidity, and lack of response to
240. See Lynn Hecht Schafran, Criminal Law: What Is Forcible Compulsion?, 34 JUDGES’ J. 43, 43–
46 (1995).
241. See, e.g., State v. Soderquist, 816 P.2d 1264, 1266 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991) (stating that the
force necessary to constitute rape is not simply the force inherent in the penetration but the force used
to overcome resistance); State v. McKnight, 774 P.2d 532, 535 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989) (noting that the
force exhibited by mere penetration is not itself enough to constitute force); State v. Johnson, 557
S.E.2d 811, 819 (W. Va. 2001) (defining “forcible compulsion”).
242. See Johnson, 557 S.E.2d at 819; Pollard v. State, 580 S.E.2d 337, 340 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003)
(“Lack of resistance, induced by fear, is force, and may be shown by the prosecutrix’[s] state of mind
from her prior experience with appellant and subjective apprehension of danger from him.” (citation
omitted)).
243. Michelle J. Anderson, Reviving Resistance in Rape Law, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 953, 962 (1998).
244. Id. at 957 (explaining that rape reformers scored a partial victory by eliminating the utmost
resistance requirement in all U.S. jurisdictions).
245. See LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:42(A)(1) (Westlaw through 2020 1st Extraordinary Sess.) (requiring
that “the victim resist[] the act to the utmost” for the crime of aggravated rape).
246. See Baker, supra note 206, at 450 (explaining that “[s]ome women may fear desertion if they
refuse to engage in sex” and that “[o]thers may be afraid that they will be hurt physically if they resist”).
247. Yochai Ataria, Trauma from an Enactive Perspective: The Collapse of the Knowing-How Structure,
23 ADAPTIVE BEHAV. 143, 150 (2015).
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stimulation. 248 Further, it is a common response to sexual assault. 249 Victims
who experience physical immobility in response to a sexual assault are not
capable of resisting; in jurisdictions that require resistance, prosecutors are not
able to prove the statutory elements of rape. 250 Thus, modifying the standard
from “utmost resistance” to “reasonable resistance” or simply “resistance” has
not resulted in more successful rape prosecutions. 251 Meaningful rape reform
requires shedding the masculine framework that defines rape and assessing
whether the woman’s response was emotionally appropriate—not whether it
was reasonable.
II. EMOTION IN DECISION-MAKING
Emotions are integral to the collective human experience. As Professor
Ronald de Sousa aptly opines, “A truly emotionless being would be either some
kind of Kantian monster with a computer brain and a pure rational will, or else
a Cartesian animal-machine, an ant, perhaps, in which every ‘want’ is
preprogrammed and every ‘belief’ simply a releasing cue for a specific
response.” 252 Despite the centrality of emotion to the human experience,
appeals to reason dominate the common law. Emotion was not only eschewed
by jurists, but it was also largely ignored by psychologists and decision
scientists.
For example, B.F. Skinner did not view emotions as important and denied
any “causal connection between the reinforcing effect of a stimulus and the
248. See Brian P. Marx, John P. Forsyth & Jennifer M. Lexington, Tonic Immobility as an Evolved
Predator Defense: Implications for Sexual Assault Survivors, 15 CLINICAL PSYCH. 74, 75 (2008).
249. See, e.g., Arturo Bados, Lidia Toribio & Eugeni García-Grau, Traumatic Events and Tonic
Immobility, 11 SPANISH J. PSYCH. 516, 516 (2008); Adrian W. Coxell & Michael B. King, Adult Male
Rape and Sexual Assault: Prevalence, Re-victimisation and the Tonic Immobility Response, 25 SEXUAL &
RELATIONSHIP THERAPY 372, 374 (2010); Sunda Friedman TeBockhorst, Mary Sean O’Halloran &
Blair N. Nyline, Tonic Immobility Among Survivors of Sexual Assault, 7 PSYCH. TRAUMA 171, 171 (2015).
250. See Goldberg v. State, 395 A.2d 1213, 1215–16 (Md. 1979). In many cases force cannot be
proven. For example, in Goldberg v. State, 395 A.2d 1213 (Md. 1979), the defendant told the victim, a
female high school student, that he was a freelance agent and could help her become a model. Id. at
1215–16. She agreed to meet him and went to his studio. Id. When he began to remove her shirt, she
said no and pulled away but later removed her clothes at his request. Id. At trial, the victim testified
that she repeatedly told the defendant she did not want to have sexual intercourse. Id. She also testified
that she was afraid because the defendant was larger and they were alone in an isolated area. Id. The
trial court returned a conviction that was reversed on appeal. Id. at 1220. Although the appellate court
conceded that the victim did not consent to intercourse, the court concluded that the defendant did not
force her to have sex and her fear that he would overcome any physical resistance she might offer was
not reasonable. Id.
251. See Gruber, Rape, Feminism, and the War on Crime, supra note 208, at 652 (“Consequently,
realist rape reform has had questionable empirical effect on rape reporting and conviction rates. Its
norming potential, moreover, is severely limited by the prevalence of culturally embedded sexism and
the conflicting messages sent by criminal law in general.”); David P. Bryden, Redefining Rape, 3 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REV. 317, 318–20 (2000).
252. RONALD DE SOUSA, THE RATIONALITY OF EMOTION 190 (1987).
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feelings to which it gives rise.” 253 Similarly, expected utility theory dating back
to Bernoulli largely ignores the role of emotion. 254 The lack of attention given
to emotion stemmed from the belief that emotions were inherently unstable and
unpredictable and therefore could not be measured objectively. 255 However,
over the last two decades, the number of publications concerned with the role
and function of emotions in decision-making has skyrocketed. 256
Nobel Laureate Herbert Simon profoundly shifted the direction of
research when he introduced the concept of bounded rationality. 257 Challenging
existing rational-decision models, Simon suggested that cognitive limitations
necessarily place bounds on human rationality. 258 Simon’s work subsequently
changed the course of psychology, economics, political science, and many other
fields. Now, most social scientists believe that emotions are central to decisionmaking. 259
But despite the surge of publications on emotion and decision-making, a
widely accepted definition of emotion remains elusive. 260 When describing
253. B.F. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNITY 107 (1971).
254. See Milton Friedman & L.J. Savage, The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk, 56 J. POL.
ECON. 279, 281 (1948) (“The idea that choices among alternatives involving risk can be explained by
the maximization of expected utility is ancient, dating back at least to D. Bernoulli’s celebrated analysis
of the St. Petersburg paradox.”). For a discussion of the St. Petersburg Paradox—which was posed by
Nicolas Bernoulli and “solved” by his nephew Daniel Bernoulli—see generally PAUL ANAND,
FOUNDATIONS OF RATIONAL CHOICE UNDER RISK 131 (1993).
255. Peter Brandon Bayer, Not Interaction but Melding—The “Russian Dressing” Theory of Emotions:
An Explanation of the Phenomenology of Emotions and Rationality with Suggested Related Maxims for Judges
and Other Legal Decision Makers, 52 MERCER L. REV. 1033, 1072 (2001) (“Much of the criticism of
emotions stems from the belief that emotions are not manageable or are very difficult to self-govern
while reason is the triumph of calculation and self-control.”).
256. Elke U. Weber & Eric J. Johnson, Mindful Judgment and Decision Making, 60 ANN. REV.
PSYCH. 53, 65 (2009) (contrasting the emotions revolution of the past decade with the cognitive
revolution that proceeded it).
257. In Simon’s view:
“bounded rationality” is used to designate rational choice that takes into account the cognitive
limitations of the decision maker—limitations of both knowledge and computational capacity.
Bounded rationality is a central theme in the behavioral approach to economics, which is
deeply concerned with the ways in which the actual decision-making process influences the
decisions that are reached.
Herbert A. Simon, Bounded Rationality, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS
266, 266 (John Eatwell, Murray Milgate & Peter Newman eds., 1987).
258. Id.
259. See, e.g., Kristen A. Lindquist, Tor D. Wager, Hedy Kober, Eliza Bliss-Moreau & Lisa
Feldman Barrett, The Brain Basis of Emotion: A Meta-Analytic Review, 35 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCIS. 121,
142 (2012); George F. Loewenstein, Elke U. Weber, Christopher K. Hsee & Ned Welch, Risk as
Feelings, 127 PSYCH. BULL. 267, 267 (2001); Hans-Rüdiger Pfister & Gisela Böhm, The Multiplicity of
Emotions: A Framework of Emotional Functions in Decision Making, 3 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING
5, 5–6 (2008).
260. See, e.g., Paul Thomas Young, Feeling and Emotion, in HANDBOOK OF GENERAL
PSYCHOLOGY 749, 749 (Benjamin B. Wolman ed., 1973) (“Almost everyone except the psychologist
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emotion, four components are generally taken into account: emotional
experience, 261 physiological arousal, 262 expressive reactions, 263 and emotionrelated instrumental activities. 264 Research has increasingly supported the idea
that there are several distinct emotions (such as joy, sadness, fear, anger, and
regret) which manifest in different facial expressions that are observable across
different cultures and in characteristic action tendencies such as approach,
inaction, avoidance, and attack. 265 Scientists believe that emotions originate
during infancy and that basic emotional reactions have been crucial for survival
and adaptation. 266
Moods, feelings, and emotions can all be referred to as affective states. 267
Affective states have a profound impact on decision-making in a multitude of
ways. Emotions influence choices. 268 For example, decisions can be driven by
the desire to avoid or reduce such feelings as guilt, regret, scorn, or sadness. 269
knows what an emotion is. . . . The trouble with the psychologist is that emotional processes and states
are complex and can be analyzed from so many points of view that a complete picture is virtually
impossible. It is necessary, therefore, to examine emotional events piecemeal and in different
systematic contexts.”).
261. The James-Langue theory of emotion suggests that we experience conscious emotion in
response to physiological changes in our body. See Walter B. Cannon, The James-Lange Theory of
Emotions: A Critical Examination and an Alternative Theory, 39 AM. J. PSYCH. 106, 106–07 (1927).
262. Recent studies suggest that the hypothalamus, amygdala, and part of the prefrontal cortex are
critical in the processing of emotions. See, e.g., Matthew L. Dixon, Ravi Thiruchselvam, Rebecca Todd
& Kalina Christoff, Emotion and the Prefrontal Cortex: An Integrative Review, 143 PSYCH. BULL. 1033,
1041–42 (2017).
263. See R. Thomas Boone & Joseph G. Cunningham, Children’s Decoding of Emotion in Expressive
Body Movement: The Development of Cue Attunement, 34 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCH. 1007, 1007 (1998)
(describing nonverbal communication of emotion as important and including “a spontaneous
component that is nonpropositional, involuntary, and expressive and may include a symbolic
component that is propositional, intentional, and referential”).
264. See Sam J. Maglio, Peter M. Gollwitzer & Gabriele Oettingen, Emotion and Control in the
Planning of Goals, 38 MOTIVATION & EMOTION 620, 629 (2014) (noting that emotion may instead be
conceptualized as “exerting an indirect force on action, through which people engage in cognitive
elaborations in response to emotional experience, which in turn informs potential future behaviors”
(citation omitted)).
265. See generally Phillip Shaver, Judith Schwartz, Donald Kirson & Cary O’Connor, Emotion
Knowledge: Further Exploration of a Prototype Approach, 52 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 1061 (1987)
(reporting on two studies that examine the hierarchical organization and prototypes of emotions).
266. See Ashley L. Ruba, Andrew N. Meltzoff & Betty M. Repacholi, How Do You Feel? Preverbal
Infants Match Negative Emotions to Events, 55 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCH. 1138, 1138–39 (2019)
(discussing how infants categorize emotion).
267. See Eddie Harmon-Jones, Philip A. Gable & Tom F. Price, The Influence of Affective States
Varying in Motivational Intensity on Cognitive Scope, FRONTIERS INTEGRATIVE NEUROSCIENCE, Sept.
10, 2012, at 1, 1 (discussing the relationship between emotion, affective states, and motivation).
268. See Myeong-Gu Seo & Lisa Feldman Barrett, Being Emotional During Decision Making—Good
or Bad? An Empirical Investigation, 50 ACAD. MGMT. J. 923, 933–34 (2007).
269. See Rajagopal Raghunathan & Michel Tuan Pham, All Negative Moods Are Not Equal:
Motivational Influences of Anxiety and Sadness on Decision Making, 79 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. &
HUM. DECISION PROCESS 56, 70 (1999) (finding that anxious individuals prefer low-risk, low-reward
options when making decisions to avoid negative consequences).
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Decisions can also be influenced by positive emotions. For example, happiness
correlates with creative and flexible decision-making. 270 Emotions can exist
before and during the cognitive process. Scientists have found different ways
of measuring emotion, including self-reporting, 271 evaluating indices of
autonomic nervous system activation based on electrodermal (referencing the
sweat gland) or cardiovascular (referencing the blood circulatory system)
responses, 272 startle reflex, 273 neuroimaging, 274 facial behavior, 275 and voice
characteristics. 276 Researchers now believe that emotion and cognition are not
separate systems but instead are systems that continuously interact with each
other. 277

270. Alice M. Isen, An Influence of Positive Affect on Decision Making in Complex Situations: Theoretical
Issues with Practical Implications, 11 J. CONSUMER PSYCH. 75, 80 (2001).
271. See ROBERT PLUTCHIK & HENRY KELLERMAN, EMOTIONS PROFILE INDEX 1–2 (1974).
For example, Robert Plutchik identified eight primary emotions consisting of fear, anger, joy, sadness,
acceptance, disgust, expectancy, and surprise and developed the Emotions Profile Index to measure
these emotions. Id. at 1. The index contains sixty-two forced-choice emotion descriptor pairs: responses
are transformed into scales representing each of the eight emotions. Id. at 1–2.
272. See, e.g., Fabina Silva Ribeiro, Flávia Heloísa Santos, Pedro Barbas Albuquerque & Patrícia
Oliveira-Silva, Emotional Induction Through Music: Measuring Cardiac and Electrodermal Responses of
Emotional States and Their Persistence, FRONTIERS PSYCH., Mar. 6, 2019, at 1, 4 (measuring skin
conductance level and heart rate to assess emotional response to music).
273. See, e.g., Margaret M. Bradley & Dean Sabatinelli, Startle Reflex Modulation: Perception,
Attention, and Emotion, in 21 EXPERIMENTAL METHODS IN NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 65, 65–66 (Kenneth
Hugdahl ed., 2003) (describing the affective modulation of the startle reflex).
274. Electroencephalography and imaging techniques such as functional magnetic resonance
imaging and positron emission tomography have been used to investigate central nervous system
responses during positive and negative emotions. See Willem J. Kop, Stephen J. Synowski, Miranda E.
Newell, Louis A. Schmidt, Shari R. Waldstein & Nathan A. Fox, Autonomic Nervous System Reactivity
to Positive and Negative Mood Induction: The Role of Acute Psychological Responses and Frontal Electrocortical
Activity, 86 BIOLOGICAL PSYCH. 230, 231 (2011).
275. Electromyography (“EMG”) has been developed to recognize activation of facial muscles as
accurately and distinctly as possible by using surface electrodes. Karsten Wolf, Reinhard Mass, Thomas
Ingenbleek, Falk Kiefer, Dieter Naber & Klaus Wiedemann, The Facial Pattern of Disgust, Appetence,
Excited Joy and Relaxed Joy: An Improved Facial EMG Study, 46 SCANDINAVIAN J. PSYCH. 403, 405
(2005). Using EMG, researchers have identified the specific facial muscle patterns used to display
disgust, appetite, relaxed joy, and aroused joy. Id. at 407–08.
276. In trying to better understand how vocal expression conveys emotion, the usual approach is
to measure emotion-relevant characteristics of the voice using computerized acoustic parameter
extraction methods. Florian Eyben, Klaus R. Scherer, Björn W. Schuller, Johan Sundberg, Elisabeth
André, Carlos Busso, Laurence Y. Devillers, Julien Epps, Petri Laukka, Shrikanth S. Narayanan &
Khiet P. Truong, The Geneva Minimalistic Acoustic Parameter Set (GeMAPS) for Voice Research and
Affective Computing, 7 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON AFFECTIVE COMPUTING 190, 190 (2016). As an
example, Florian Eyben and his coauthors describe a standard set of objective voice cues containing
frequency, energy, spectral balance, and temporal features. Id. at 192–94. Anger is associated with high
frequency levels, increase frequency variability, high voice intensity level, and fast speech rate. Patrik
N. Juslin & Petri Laukka, Communication of Emotions in Vocal Expression and Music Performance: Different
Channels, Same Code?, 129 PSYCH. BULL. 770, 802 (2003).
277. Terry A. Maroney, The Persistent Cultural Script of Judicial Dispassion, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 629,
649 (2011) (arguing that social science supports the belief that emotion enables reason).

99 N.C. L. REV. 1027 (2021)

1066

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99-4

One of the seminal findings over the last couple of decades has been
related to research regarding the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (“vmPFC”). 278
Researchers have found that patients with focal vmPFC damage have difficulty
in value-based decision-making, despite intact performance on conventional
measures of intelligence. 279 One of the first studies to observe this defect in a
laboratory setting used a gambling task that required subjects to learn about
rewards and punishments under conditions of risk, ambiguity, and reversing
contingencies. 280
In a famous study designed and conducted by Antonio Damasio,
participants with vmPFC injuries repeatedly selected a riskier financial option
over a safer option, even to the point of bankruptcy. 281 The study utilized real
money, yet the participants continued to make bad choices despite their
cognitive understanding of the suboptimality of their choices. 282 Physiological
measures of galvanic skin response suggested that these participants behaved
this way because they did not experience the emotional signals that lead normal
decision makers to have a reasonable fear of high risks. 283
Subsequent research with subjects who have vmPFC damage have
documented value-based decision-making deficits in a variety of contexts,
including risky gambles, probabilistic reinforcement learning, economic
exchange, and simple binary item preference. 284 Additionally, animal studies
have demonstrated that the prefrontal cortex plays a central role in updating

278. Sarah T. Gonzalez & Michael S. Fanselow, The Role of Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex and
Context in Regulating Fear Learning and Extinction, 13 PSYCH. & NEUROSCIENCE at 1, 1 (2020),
https://doi.org/10.1037/pne0000207 [https://perma.cc/R3NM-Y6K8].
279. See, e.g., Steven W. Anderson, Joseph Barrash, Antoine Bechara & Daniel Tranel, Impairments
of Emotion and Real-World Complex Behavior Following Childhood- or Adult-Onset Damage to Ventromedial
Prefrontal Cortex, 12 J. INT’L NEUROPSYCHOLOGY SOC’Y 224, 230 (2006) (finding that patients with
vmPFC damage had severe social and emotional dysfunction); Paul J. Eslinger & Antonio R. Damasio,
Severe Disturbance of Higher Cognition After Bilateral Frontal Lobe Ablation: Patient EVR, 35 NEUROLOGY
1731, 1735–37 (1985) (discussing patient with vmPCF damage whose measurable intelligence was
superior but whose decision-making ability was poor).
280. See Antoine Bechara, Antonio R. Damasio, Hanna Damasio & Steven W. Anderson,
Insensitivity to Future Consequences Following Damage to Human Prefrontal Cortex, 50 COGNITION 7, 8–11
(1994).
281. Antoine Bechara, Daniel Tranel & Hanna Damasio, Characterization of the Decision-Making
Deficit of Patients with Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex Lesions, 123 BRAIN 2189, 2198 (2000).
282. Id.
283. Id. at 2190.
284. See, e.g., Nathalie Camille, Cathryn A. Griffiths, Khoi Vo, Lesley K. Fellows & Joseph W.
Kable, Ventromedial Frontal Lobe Damage Disrupts Value Maximization in Humans, 31 J. NEUROSCIENCE
7527, 7531 (2011) (using simple real world choices to illustrate that subjects with vmPFC damage make
choices that violate the generalized axiom of their revealed preference); Michael Koenigs & Daniel
Tranel, Irrational Economic Decision-Making After Ventromedial Prefrontal Damage: Evidence from the
Ultimatum Game, 27 J. NEUROSCIENCE 951, 954 (2007).
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the reward values of stimuli and outcomes. 285 For example, electrophysiological
recording studies in both monkeys and rats demonstrate that vmPFC encodes
the reward properties of stimuli. 286
In addition to the neurobiological explanations of how emotion influences
decision-making, the Appraisal-Tendency Framework (“ATF”) has been widely
studied. 287 ATF classifies emotions as either integral or incidental. 288 Integral
emotions are triggered by the immediate interaction. 289 In contrast, incidental
emotions carry over from situation to situation and are not triggered by the
current situation. 290 ATF predicts that incidental emotions carry over to
subsequent judgments and tendencies influencing decision-making in two ways:
content effects and depth of processing effects. 291
The last few decades have witnessed an explosion of research exploring the
interplay of emotion and cognition. This ever-growing body of research
demonstrates that emotional cues, states, traits, and disorders can profoundly
influence key elements of cognition. Brain scans show that emotion and
cognition are deeply interwoven in the fabric of the brain, suggesting that
widely held beliefs about the dichotomy between emotion and reason are
fundamentally flawed. 292
III. INCORPORATING EMOTION
As discussed previously, the reasonable-man standard suffers from many
flaws. 293 The current incarnation of the reasonable man, the reasonable person,
cannot be extricated from the reasonable man who preceded it. Far from
285. See, e.g., Léon Tremblay & Wolfram Schultz, Relative Reward Preference in Primate
Orbitofrontal Cortex, 398 NATURE 704, 706 (1999) (finding that monkeys with orbitofrontal lesions
respond abnormally to changes in reward expectations and show altered reward preferences).
286. Id.
287. See, e.g., Jennifer S. Lerner & Dacher Keltner, Beyond Valence: Toward a Model of EmotionSpecific Influences on Judgment and Choice, 14 COGNITION & EMOTION 473, 476–77 (2000) [hereinafter
Lerner & Keltner, Beyond Valence]; Jennifer S. Lerner & Dacher Keltner, Fear, Anger, and Risk, 81 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 146, 146 (2001).
288. Lerner & Keltner, Beyond Valence, supra note 287, at 474.
289. See Timothy C. Barnum & Starr J. Solomon, Fight or Flight: Integral Emotions and Violent
Intentions, 57 CRIMINOLOGY 659, 662 (2019) (defining integral emotions as “immediate emotions
elicited by perceived or imagined features of a target object in a particular situation”).
290. Lerner & Keltner, Beyond Valance, supra note 287, at 474–75.
291. Id.
292. Hadas Okon-Singer, Talma Hendler, Luiz Pessoa & Alexander J. Shackman, The Neurobiology
of Emotion–Cognition Interactions: Fundamental Questions and Strategies for Future Research, FRONTIERS
HUM. NEUROSCIENCE, Feb. 17, 2015, at 1, 5 (explaining that “contemporary theorists have
increasingly rejected the claim that emotion and cognition are categorically different, motivated in part
by recent imaging evidence demonstrating the overlap of emotional and cognitive processes in the
brain” (internal citations omitted)).
293. See Robert A. Prentice, Chicago Man, K-T Man, and the Future of Behavioral Law and Economics,
56 VAND. L. REV. 1663, 1672 (2003) (noting that the reasonable man has “no room for cognitive
limitations, emotion, or altruism, [and] describes neither how man does act nor how man should act”).
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objective, the reasonable-man standard is shrouded in subjectivity and imbibed
with White masculine traits and values. Despite the reality that reason is
intertwined with emotion, legal rhetoric continues to construct a false reality in
which the reasonable man is rational, neutral, and free from emotion. 294 The
notion that reason is the key to prudent decision-making does not reflect current
understandings of cognition. The annals of neuroscience literature have proven
that emotions and intuitions are an inherent part of our reasoning process. 295
Given the centrality of emotion to decision-making, legal standards should not
shun the role of emotion. Instead, legal standards should require an
acknowledgment and assessment of the role of emotion when evaluating
conduct.
A.

Emotion and Negligence

Tort law has never been value free. For instance, the dominance of
reasonableness has largely banished emotion to the periphery of tort law. 296 The
common law created remedies for physical harms and harms to property—
harms that reasonable men deemed worthy of redress. By contrast, redress for
emotional harms, especially for women, was difficult to obtain. 297 In the
nineteenth century, tort claims for emotional injuries were governed by the
contemporaneous physical impact rule (“impact rule”), which only allowed
recovery when the plaintiff’s emotional harm was coupled with a direct physical
impact or physical injury. 298 Courts justified this rule as a means of ensuring
genuineness. 299 While early impact-rule cases did not explicitly discriminate on
the basis of sex, the impact rule was often applied to cases dealing with gendered
harms including miscarriage, premature birth, and “hysterical” disorders. 300
For example, in Mitchell v. Rochester Railway, 301 the plaintiff, Annie
Mitchell, was waiting to board one of the defendant’s railway cars when a horse
car driven by defendant’s employee came so close to hitting her that “she stood

294. See Lucy Jewel, Neurorhetoric, Race, and the Law: Toxic Neural Pathways and Healing
Alternatives, 76 MD. L. REV. 663, 674 (2017) (“Repeated exposure to certain forms of narrative rhetoric
causes the neural synapse circuits associated with these stories to become so strong that they form a
permanent part of the bran’s structure.”).
295. See Okon-Singer et al., supra note 292, at 5 (describing research that described the interplay
between emotion and cognition).
296. See Martha Chamallas, Removing Emotional Harm from the Core of Tort Law, 54 VAND. L. REV.
751, 752 (2001) (“In the hierarchy of torts, emotional and relational harms are not as fully protected as
physical injury and property damage.”).
297. See Martha Chamallas & Linda K. Kerber, Women, Mothers, and the Law of Fright: A History,
88 MICH. L. REV. 814, 815–16 (1990).
298. Id. at 819.
299. See Homans v. Bos. Elevated Ry. Co., 62 N.E. 737, 737 (Mass. 1902).
300. Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 297, at 832.
301. 45 N.E. 354 (N.Y. 1896).
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between the horses’ heads when they were stopped.” 302 Mitchell claimed that
her fright stemming from the incident caused her to lose consciousness and
suffer a miscarriage. 303 Despite medical testimony corroborating her claim, the
court held that “the plaintiff cannot recover for injuries occasioned by fright, as
there was no immediate personal injury.” 304 The court justified its holding by
predicting that allowing such claims “would naturally result in a flood of
litigation in cases where the injury complained of may be easily feigned without
detection, and where the damages must rest upon mere conjecture or
speculation.” 305
Thus, emotion in tort law was not only excluded from the reasonableperson standard, but emotional claims also often went unredressed by common
law rules that treated claims for emotional injuries differently from physical
claims. Currently, the role of emotion in tort law is expanding. The Restatement
(Third) of Torts recognizes claims for stand-alone emotional distress. 306 Such
recognition shifts the debate from whether negligent infliction of emotional
distress claims should be recognized at all as a cause of action to a discussion of
what circumstances would trigger liability. Section 47 of the Restatement (Third)
of Torts authorizes providing a tort remedy if the conduct producing the distress
“(a) places the other in danger of immediate bodily harm and the emotional
harm results from the danger; or (b) occurs in the course of specified categories
of activities, undertakings, or relationships in which negligent conduct is
especially likely to cause serious emotional harm.” 307 Although maintaining the
distinction between physical bodily harm and emotional harm, the Restatement
(Third) of Torts makes clear that neither physical impact nor physical injury is
required. 308
Evolving research in the fields of psychology and psychiatry provide a
sounder basis for recognizing such claims. The recognition of such claims is
crucial to providing remedies for women who suffer reproductive injuries and
harms related to sexual exploitation. 309 While the role of emotion in tort is
evolving, the evolution is far from complete. There is scant scientific evidence
supporting the dichotomy and disparate treatment of emotional and bodily
harms. Further, as tort law has evolved to provide redress to more emotional

302. Id. at 354.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 354–55.
306. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 47 (AM.
L. INST. 2012).
307. Id.
308. See id.
309. See, e.g., Martha Chamallas, Unpacking Emotional Distress: Sexual Exploitation, Reproductive
Harm, and Fundamental Rights, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1109, 1109–10 (2009).
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harms, the framework for deciding liability, namely the reasonable-man
standard and its progeny, has not.
The prima facie case of negligence requires duty, breach, factual causation,
proximate or legal causation, and damages. 310 The reasonable-person standard
is still the default standard used to evaluate whether the defendant breached
their duty to the plaintiff. Thus, unreasonable conduct is deemed negligent
conduct and constitutes a breach of duty. Centuries of common law have
solidified the notion that reasonableness should demarcate the line between
negligent and nonnegligent conduct. As a result, the standard itself has rarely
been challenged. Perhaps the reasonableness standard has managed to largely
escape scrutiny because there is something inherently unorthodox and
unreasonable about faulting reason as a standard for liability. At first blush,
divorcing reasonableness from the negligence analysis seems preposterous.
Challenging the status quo is, by definition, unconventional. Arguably,
removing reasonableness from its hallowed perch requires evaluating negligence
through an entirely new lens.
A jury instruction describing the emotional-woman standard would define
negligence as conduct resulting from an inappropriate emotional response to a
given situation that causes harm to another. The emotional-woman standard
permits juries to focus on the human or emotional basis for underlying conduct,
actions, or inactions that cause harm. In deciding what is emotionally
appropriate, community notions of morality are relevant. A fact finder’s
assessment of morality should reflect the country’s pluralistic communities.
Evaluating negligence in light of what would be emotionally appropriate
explicitly introduces feelings, culture, ethics, morality, and relationships into
the negligence analysis. Unlike the reasonable-man standard, the emotionalwoman standard unapologetically does not purport to be dispassionate and
objective. As Professor William Prosser observed, tort law evolves constantly
because it serves as a “battleground of social theory.” 311 As society accepts that
tort law evolves, it seems ripe to question whether continued adherence to the
reasonable-man standard is anachronistic.
The reasonable-man standard reflects the values of its creators, but it does
so under the guise of objectivity. The status quo reasonable person purports to
apply an objective standard, but studies have shown that dispassionate, reasoned
decisions are illusory. 312 Availability heuristics often short-circuit deliberate,
310. See David G. Owen, The Five Elements of Negligence, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1671, 1672 (2007).
311. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 14–15 (4th ed. 1971).
312. See, e.g., Lily A. Gutnik, A. Forogh Hakimzada, Nicole A. Yoskowitz & Vimla L. Patel, The
Role of Emotion in Decision-making: A Cognitive Neuroeconomic Approach Towards Understanding Sexual
Risk Behavior, 39 J. BIOMEDICAL INFORMATICS 720, 725–27 (2006) (discussing the various ways in
which emotion impacts decision-making); Eyal Kalanthroff, Noga Cohen & Avishai Henik, Stop
Feeling: Inhibition of Emotional Interference Following Stop-Signal Trials, 7 FRONTIERS HUM.

99 N.C. L. REV. 1027 (2021)

2021]

THE EMOTIONAL WOMAN

1071

rational decision-making. 313 Emotion, not reason, seems critical to decisionmaking. 314 For example, the cultural evaluator theory of risk perception posits
that when an individual is weighing what position to take on a dangerous
activity, they are not rationally or irrationally considering their expected utility
but instead evaluating the social meaning of that activity. 315 Our thoughts are
not dispassionate or neutral. We are not thinking beings who feel but instead
feeling beings who think. 316
Thus, arguing for emotional decision-making is not as radical as it might
seem. The argument for emotional decision-making departs from the status quo
because it deliberately prioritizes emotion. When evaluating whether conduct
is negligent, the emotional standard directs juries to weigh whether the
defendant exercised the degree of care that an emotional woman (or person)
would have used under the same circumstances. Under this standard, juries
would analyze the appropriateness of one’s emotions or emotional response.
Such an evaluation requires examining the accuracy of a defendant’s perception
of triggering events and passing judgment on their evaluation. Emotion as a
standard allows for judging whether the event really occurred as the defendant
believed and whether a wrong occurred. 317
For example, in Wassell v. Adams, 318 the plaintiff was found to be ninetyseven percent at fault for her rape. 319 The plaintiff, Susan Wassell, was raped in

NEUROSCIENCE, Mar. 14, 2013, at 1, 6 (suggesting that “a two-way connection between inhibitory
control and emotion in which emotion both disrupts and is modulated by inhibitory control”);
Katherine E. Vytal, Brian R. Cornwell, Allison M. Letkiewicz, Nicole E. Arkin & Christian Grillon,
The Complex Interaction Between Anxiety and Cognition: Insight from Spatial and Verbal Working Memory,
FRONTIERS HUM. NEUROSCIENCE, Mar. 28, 2013, at 1, 8 (finding that emotions related to anxiety
strengthen some cognitive processes while weakening others).
313. People assess the frequency of a class or the probability of an event by the ease with which
instances or occurrences can be brought to mind. For example, one may assess the risk of heart attack
among middle-aged people by recalling such occurrences among one’s acquaintances. Amos Tversky &
Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1127 (1974).
314. See supra Part II.
315. Dan M. Kahan, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Risk Regulation, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 750–52
(2008); see also Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 951–52
(1995) (“If an action creates a stigma, that stigma is a social meaning. If a gesture is an insult, that insult
is a social meaning.”).
316. See, e.g., DANIEL GOLEMAN, THE BRAIN AND EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE: NEW
INSIGHTS 19–20 (2011) (discussing the case of a “brilliant corporate lawyer” whose brain tumor surgery
required cutting “circuits that connect key areas of the prefrontal cortex . . . and the amygdala in the
midbrain’s area for emotions”; thereafter the lawyer’s “IQ, memory, and attention” remained
unimpaired but he could no longer function as a lawyer because he could no longer “connect his
thoughts with the emotional pros and cons”).
317. JOHN DEIGH, EMOTIONS, VALUES, AND THE LAW 12 (2008) (explaining that emotional
states can be regarded as “rationally warranted or unwarranted, justified or unjustified by the
circumstances in which they occur or the beliefs on which they are based”).
318. 865 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1989).
319. Id. at 852.
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her motel room. 320 While fast asleep, she was awakened by a knocking on her
door at one o’clock in the morning. 321 Wassell assumed that her fiancé was at
the door and opened it. 322 Instead, it was a well-dressed man who asked for a
glass of water and Wassell obliged. 323 The man asked to use the bathroom and
again Wassell obliged. 324 When he exited the bathroom, he was half dressed and
Wassell attempted to flee. 325 She ran into the hallway and beat on the door of
the adjacent room and screamed. 326 Her screams were not heard, and her
assailant dragged her back into the hotel room and raped her. 327 Wassell alleged
that the motel was negligent in failing to warn her or take other precautions to
protect her against the assault. 328
In analyzing Wassell’s negligence, the court opined about what a
reasonable person in Wassell’s situation would do and, ultimately, concluded
that the jury’s conclusion that Wassell was ninety-seven percent at fault was
consistent with the evidence and the law. 329 Wassell’s negligent act was opening
the door in the middle of the night when she did not see anyone after looking
through the peep hole and not fleeing when the stranger used the bathroom. 330
When assessing the reasonableness of Wassell’s action, a jury will undoubtedly
focus on the fact that it was late at night, that the plaintiff was alone in a hotel
room in a strange city, that she opened her door, and that she had an
opportunity to flee. A reasonable and rational review of the facts supports the
jury’s verdict, but what if the jury analyzed whether Wassell had an
inappropriate emotional response that caused her harm?
If Wassell’s conduct is evaluated from an emotional lens rather than a
reasonable one, it would be much harder to conclude that she was negligent. It
would be difficult for a jury to conclude that her response was emotionally
inappropriate such that she was ninety-seven percent responsible for her harm.
The emotional-woman standard would direct the jury to focus on what Wassell
was feeling at that moment and to ascertain whether her conduct was
emotionally appropriate in light of the circumstances.
Viewed, hypothetically, from the perspective of the emotional-woman
standard, the jury could have found an alternative reading of the facts: Wassell
was aroused from a deep slumber and drowsily opened the door expecting her
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.

Id. at 851.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 852.
Id. at 852, 856.
Id. at 852–53.
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fiancé. She was startled by a well-dressed stranger who asked for water and
asked to use her bathroom. In that moment, Wassell probably felt anxiety, fear,
helplessness, and confusion. As the stranger used her bathroom, Wassell was
likely weighing whether she would have enough time to escape and whether
there was even a threat that she needed to escape from. Her conduct was
emotionally appropriate given the circumstances and would not be deemed
negligent under an emotional-woman standard.
By reframing the standard of care, the emotional-woman standard focuses
on the emotions that drive the conduct which leads to the harm. Fact finders
are explicitly free to consider the appropriateness of the emotional response. If
the emotional response is appropriate, then the conduct that results from the
emotional response is not a breach of the standard of care. If the emotional
response is inappropriate, then the conduct that stems from that response is a
breach of the standard of care.
An emotional response may be inappropriate under two scenarios. First,
the emotion may be inappropriate because the defendant erroneously perceived
the situation. Sometimes the misperception is rather benign. For example, a
babysitter lights a candle and leaves a toddler in the room briefly to chat with a
neighbor. Left alone, the toddler knocks over the candle and burns himself and
the sofa. The babysitter’s conduct was emotionally inappropriate because she
did not properly value the toddler’s safety. In other cases, the conduct results
from an erroneous perception that is based on a stereotype. For example, a
White woman might feel threatened when she sees a Black male wearing a
hoodie walking in her yard. If her fear leads her to harm the Black male who
was simply trying to find his cat, then her conduct is emotionally inappropriate
because it stemmed from prejudice.
Second, an emotion could be deemed inappropriate when the defendant
displays emotion in an inappropriate manner. For example, if a woman drinks
too much after a fight with her partner and crashes her car, injuring an innocent
plaintiff, then the wife’s conduct is negligent because her expression of emotion
was not appropriate. Her anger drove her to drink and drive, which is
emotionally inappropriate conduct. The standard allows juries to find liability
when the conduct is blameworthy. Blameworthy conduct occurs when the
defendant did not act in an emotionally appropriate way. It is not emotionally
appropriate to act with disregard for the well-being or safety of others when one
has the ability to conform one’s behavior to societal expectations. When one
does not have the ability to conform their behavior to societal expectations, then
the conduct will be evaluated based on the plaintiff’s circumstances and
capabilities. Thus, children, defendants acting in response to a sudden
emergency, and mentally ill defendants would, under the emotional-woman
standard, be evaluated based on whether the conduct was emotionally
appropriate given their characteristics.
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Critics will undoubtedly argue that inserting emotion and removing
reasonableness from the standard introduces increased uncertainty to the
analysis. One may argue that emotion is a nebulous concept that gives the jury
no direction or standard to apply and will result in legal bedlam. This
predictable, knee-jerk reaction ignores the reality of the reasonable-person
standard. Both emotion and reasonableness are hard to define. Both concepts
allow for value-laden preferences to impact liability decisions. Yet, in picking
emotion over reason, the reference point shifts in a positive direction and
provides for transparency. There is value in explicitly owning that the legal
framework is applying subjective assessments rather than an “objective”
evaluation.
The reasonable man is a fictional character, but in practice, he is a disguise
for the value judgments made by the fact finder. The emotional-woman
standard authentically and explicitly embraces making value judgments and
some level of subjectivity. In most pattern jury instructions, negligence is
defined by referring to reasonableness or the reasonable person. 331 The
importance of jury instructions cannot be stressed enough. Studies of the
American jury system confirm that juries take their job seriously and, in the
vast majority of cases, follow the legal instructions provided by the judge. 332
Thus, how negligence is framed in jury instructions is of consequence.
Highlighting the role of emotion in ascertaining whether the conduct was
negligent serves multiple purposes. First, it recognizes and acknowledges the
current social science research on decision-making, which makes clear that
emotion is integral to decision-making. 333 Second, it allows the jury to consider
whether the conduct was emotionally appropriate. Third, it intentionally
embraces an element of subjectivity and does not falsely purport to be a purely
objective standard. Fourth, it provides a more humanistic approach to
ascertaining negligence and allows weighing of circumstances without relying
on a cost-benefit analysis.
Ultimately, the emotional-woman standard is unapologetically value
laden. The law has always been intertwined with notions of morality. 334 Law is
331. Bethany K. Dumas, Jury Trials: Lay Jurors, Pattern Jury Instructions, and Comprehension Issues,
67 TENN. L. REV. 701, 739–40 (2000) (explaining that Tennessee’s pattern jury instructions define
negligence as “the failure to use reasonable care” and further clarifying that “[i]t is either doing
something that a reasonably careful person would not do, or the failure to do something that a
reasonably careful person would do, under circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence”).
332. See Debra Cassens Weiss, Jurors Take Instructions Seriously, but Do They Understand Them?,
ABA J. (Aug. 11, 2017, 2:25 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/jurors_take_instructions
_seriously_but_do_they_understand_them [https://perma.cc/7PSF-42W3]; see also NEIL VIDMAR &
VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT 249–51 (2007).
333. See Pfister & Böhm, supra note 259, at 8–9.
334. See, e.g., Richard Taylor, Law and Morality, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 611, 611 (1968) (explaining
that the law is and should be concerned with morality defined as determining “what things are good
and what they are good for”).
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central to social order and ideally supports the common good. 335 Defining the
common good necessarily draws on notions of what is virtuous and valued. 336
The early jurists valued reason and viewed it as a uniquely masculine trait. 337
Their decision deserves scrutiny. Emotion binds us together collectively.
Emotion is central to our humanity and ultimately is a more inclusive metric
for judging liability.
B.

Emotion and Criminal Law

Although reason looms large in criminal law, emotions receive inconsistent
treatment. 338 Fundamental to criminal law is the notion that the State has the
burden of proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Although it is supposed
to be a dispassionate, exacting standard, as previously discussed, juries interpret
reasonable doubt very differently. 339 Since studies have shown that jurors do
not necessarily require a very high degree of certainty to convict, exploring
other alternatives is warranted. 340 An emotional-doubt burden of proof would
not be a panacea for what ails criminal law. Moving away from a reasonable
doubt standard could open the door for juries to acquit not only based on the
intangible feeling that the defendant may be innocent, but it might also lead
jurors to acquit because they viewed the defendant as sympathetic or otherwise
felt uncomfortable with a conviction. Introducing a new burden of proof that
could lead to more discretion might lead to increased disparities in conviction
rates.
For example, although Black people and Latinos comprise just twentynine percent of the U.S. population, they make up fifty-seven percent of the
prison population. 341 Thus, an emotional-doubt standard might result in
minorities being treated even more harshly by the criminal justice system.
Although the negatives likely do not outweigh the positives, the emotionaldoubt standard encourages conversations to occur openly, rather than for jurors
to silently act on implicit or explicit biases. Freely allowing jurors to discuss
emotion could allow jurors to say the quiet part out loud, which in some
335. See id. at 644.
336. See id.
337. See id. at 615–17.
338. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law,
96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 273 (1996) (opining that criminal law’s inconsistent treatment of emotion
stems from “a long-standing dispute in Western culture about the nature and educability of the
emotions”).
339. See supra text accompanying notes 177–94.
340. See supra Section I.B.1.
341. In comparison to White individuals, the imprisonment rates are 5.9 times higher for Black
individuals and 3.1 times higher for Latino individuals. See SENTENCING PROJECT, REPORT OF THE
SENTENCING PROJECT TO THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON CONTEMPORARY
FORMS OF RACISM, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, XENOPHOBIA, AND RELATED INTOLERANCE 6–7
(2018).
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circumstances could yield decision-making that is fairer. Additionally, an
emotional-doubt standard, just like the emotional-woman standard, would more
accurately portray the discretionary and value-laden judgments that are masked
as objective standards when reasonable doubt is used.
The emotional-woman standard is not a burden of proof. Thus, this Article
is not explicitly arguing that the reasonable doubt standard should be replaced
with the emotional-doubt standard. However, this Article aspires to begin a
dialogue about how to incorporate emotion into the reasonable doubt burden of
proof. Additionally, this Article advocates for an emotional-woman standard
when assessing the applicability of self-defense. The law of self-defense is
particularly gendered in its approach to describing conduct that is worthy of
being excused. Blackstone explained that “the law . . . respects the passions of
the human mind” and allows the man confronted with “external violence . . . to
do himself that immediate justice, to which he is prompted by nature, and which
no prudential motives are strong enough to restrain.” 342 Thus, the law granted
man a privilege to defend his honor. As Justin Harlan stated in an old Supreme
Court case:
A man may repel force by force in defense of his person, habitation or
property, against one who manifestly intends and endeavors, by violence
or surprise, to commit a known felony . . . . In these cases he is not obliged
to retreat, but may pursue his adversary until he has secured himself from
all danger; and if he kill him in so doing it is called justifiable selfdefence . . . . 343
Similarly, Justice Cardozo, the celebrated jurist, wrote approvingly of the
castle doctrine, explaining that
[i]f assailed [at one’s home], he may stand his ground and resist the
attack. He is under no duty to take to the fields and the highways, a
fugitive from his own home. . . . Flight is for sanctuary and shelter, and
shelter, if not sanctuary, is in the home. 344
When critically examined, the common theme explaining self-defense law is not
that the law excuses man’s so-called primal instinct to kill when his life is
threatened but instead that the law prizes dignity and honor and excuses
conduct that defends one’s honor. 345 Androcentric values of dignity and honor
not only color the law but also impact juries. As Professors Dan Kahan and
342. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *210.
343. Beard v. United States, 158 U.S. 550, 562 (1895) (quoting EDWARD HYDE EAST, A
TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 271–72 (1716)).
344. People v. Tomlins, 107 N.E. 496, 497 (N.Y. 1914).
345. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 338, at 329–30 (“[T]he so-called ‘castle’ doctrine is
understood to spare an individual the indignity of being made a ‘fugitive from his own home.’” (quoting
Tomlins, 107 N.E. at 497)).
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Martha Nassbaum aptly note, self-defense was “one device by which juries
enforced the ‘unwritten rule’ that men may justifiably kill their wives’
paramours.” 346 Thus, self-defense laws in form and application furthered
androcentric values and notions of fairness.
Self-defense laws, however, typically do not allow for a feminine
expression of emotion. As Judy Norman’s case illustrates, women who
experience intimate partner violence and eventually kill their abusers are not
excused if the violence does not happen at the time of the battering. 347 Selfdefense laws often require a “reasonable” belief that self-defense was necessary
to repel the imminent use of unlawful deadly force by another. 348 Reasonable
belief for battered women is defined by referencing androcentric perceptions as
the norm. This “objective” inquiry into reasonableness is not objective. Instead,
it reinforces male norms under the guise of objectivity.
As commonly formulated, self-defense laws liberate men by allowing them
to defend their honor and dignity but shackle women to their abuser. Neither
the feminine perception of imminence nor the feminine expression of rage is
reflected in the common-law formulations of self-defense. The emotional
woman-standard seeks to rectify this omission. The emotional-woman standard
would require an emotionally appropriate belief that self-defense was necessary
to repel the forthcoming use of unlawful deadly force by another.
Thus, the emotional-woman standard would seek to provide a shield to
those whose actions are emotionally appropriate given the circumstances. As in
the tort context, there are a certain number of value-laden preferences that are
explicit in the standard. However, under this standard, battered women could
provide expert testimony to educate jurors and help them understand how their
actions were emotionally appropriate under the circumstances. State laws
should be modified to shift the analysis from whether the defendant reasonably
believed that the deadly force was necessary to prevent imminent harm to
whether it was emotionally appropriate for the defendant to believe that deadly
force was necessary. Juries should be encouraged to analyze what women would
have felt in their relationship. Juries should focus on the totality of
circumstances that are present when a defendant eventually kills after years of
abuse. Their responses will never be truly reasonable, but they can be
emotionally appropriate under some circumstances and such behavior should be
legally excused in some circumstances.
In sum, reasonableness is a facet in many areas of criminal law. Where
reasonableness is the standard, careful consideration should be given to whether
an emotionally appropriate standard would be a better alternative. The shift not
346. Id. at 330.
347. See State v. Norman, 324 N.C. 253, 261–66, 378 S.E.2d 8, 13–16 (1989).
348. See, e.g., United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222, 1229–30 (1973).
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only uses language that honestly describes how juries are arriving at their
decisions, but it also reframes the analysis to examine conduct in light of what
we know about emotional responses and assess whether the conduct was
blameworthy.
VI. REASON, EMOTION, AND FEMINISM
The emotional-woman standard challenges the androcentric notion that
reasonableness is integral to justice and that emotional decisions should be
avoided. As such, the emotional-woman standard builds upon existing feminist
scholarship. Much of early feminist scholarship focused on exploring sameness
and differences between and among men and women. 349 “Sameness” feminist
theories explore similarities between men and women, opining that women will
do just as well as men if only given an equal chance. 350 Sameness theorists
believe that most gender differences do not exist. 351 These theorists focus on
overtly sex-based legislation as problematic because it limits opportunities for
women.
In contrast, “difference” theories are concerned with differences between
men and women. The most influential source for difference feminism is
Professor Carol Gilligan’s book, In a Different Voice, in which Professor Gilligan
argues that women speak “in a different voice.” 352 Gilligan argues for societal
transformation based on the womanly values of responsibility, connection,
selflessness, and compassion, rather than masculine values of separation,
autonomy, and hierarchy. 353
More recent scholarship criticizes sameness and difference theories and
rejects both. For example, Professor Catharine MacKinnon argues that these
theories do not address the experiences of women who live under conditions of
sex inequality. 354 Both sameness and difference feminists use a male standard to
evaluate issues of sameness or difference, and Professor MacKinnon argues that
349. See, e.g., Linda Alcoff, Cultural Feminism Versus Post-Structuralism: The Identity Crisis in Feminist
Theory, 13 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOC’Y. 405, 417–18 (1988); Christine A. Littleton,
Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1279, 1284–85 (1987); Joan W. Scott, Deconstructing
Equality-Versus-Difference: Or, the Uses of Post-Structuralist Theory for Feminism, 14 FEMINIST STUD. 33,
43–45 (1988).
350. See Catherine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1301–
02 (1991).
351. See Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, Faulty Framework: Consequences of the Difference Model for Women
in the Law, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 309, 310–11 (1990) (arguing that a focus on gender differences
inevitably perpetuates notions of social inequality and results in women’s exclusion from decisionmaking positions).
352. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN’S
DEVELOPMENT 1–2 (34th prtg. 1996).
353. See generally id. (arguing for a gendered view of morality based on Professor Gilligan’s
observations of the different ways women and men approached certain decisions).
354. See MacKinnon, supra note 350, at 1295–97.
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men have created a societal structure in which women are subordinate. 355
Professor MacKinnon contends that sex discrimination results from the power
inequality between men and women and develops a difference-as-dominance
theory. 356 Rape, prostitution, pornography, and sexual assault of children also
play an integral role in a dominance feminist account in perpetuating a system
of sexual subordination. 357
Feminist scholars have written about the reasonable-woman standard as it
applies in employment discrimination cases 358 and criminal cases. 359 Scholars
who embrace notions of sameness feminism have criticized attempts to replace
the reasonable-man standard with the reasonable-woman standard. 360 They
argue that the reasonable-woman standard entrenches gender differences and
solidifies the view of women needing extra protection because of their
differences. 361 Sameness feminism suggests that such a standard perpetuates
cultural manifestations of distinctions between men and women, rather than
developing an egalitarian standard applicable to both sexes. 362 The emotionalwoman standard links gender with emotion which may be offensive to sameness
feminists. However, the emotional-woman standard can easily be framed as the
emotional-person standard. For the purposes of this Article, the use of
“emotional woman” is intentional to highlight how the status quo reasonableman standard is a creation of men and not women.

355. Id. at 1301–02. MacKinnon explains that
[u]ntil this model based on sameness and difference is rejected or cabined, sex equality law
may find itself increasingly unable even to advance women into male preserves—defined as
they are in terms of socially male values and biographies—for the same reason it cannot get
courts to value women’s work in spheres to which women remain confined.
Id. at 1296–97.
356. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, in FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 32, 39 (1987).
357. See id. at 40–41.
358. See, e.g., Kerns, supra note 42, at 200–01.
359. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 206, 455–56.
360. See Cahn, supra note 28, at 1402–03 (“Just like a reasonable man standard, the reasonablewoman standard is biased and deliberately ignores the reality that women’s experiences are diverse.”).
361. See, e.g., Cynthia A. Dill, The Reasonable Woman’s Standard in Sexual Harassment Litigation, 12
ME. BAR J. 154, 159 (1997) (“Substituting a reasonable woman’s standard to judge the conduct of
women, but not going further to question the inclusiveness of norms informing the reasonable person’s
standard, implies that women’s experiences and reactions are something for women only, rather than
normal human responses.”).
362. Classic liberal feminism is rooted in the notion that women are equal to men and deserve
equal rights. A woman’s equality to a man is based on her sameness to men. See generally Joan C.
Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797 (1989) (arguing against the “description of
gender provided by difference feminists”).
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Difference feminists criticize the reasonable-person standard by arguing
that only the language and not the underlying social meaning has changed. 363
Adopting the emotional-woman standard would address concerns that
difference feminists express about the reasonable-person standard. The
emotional-woman standard in essence looks at negligence with a different lens
or, to use Gilligan’s terminology, in a “different voice.” 364 The centrality of
reasonableness represents a historically masculine view of decision-making and
values. Shifting to an emotion-based standard of care not only elevates a trait
that is often associated with women but also embraces modern understandings
of brain function. 365 Similarly, the emotional-woman standard of care is in
accord with dominance theories of feminism because it acknowledges that the
reasonable-man standard and its purported gender-neutral variation portrays
androcentric norms as objective. Far from objective, the reasonable-man
standard functions to shield men from consequences while subordinating
women.
Other feminist theories have conceptualized gender injustices differently.
Intersectional feminist theory argues that gender cannot be analyzed without
considering other contexts, such as race, religion, age, disability, and
immigration status. 366 In particular, some intersectional feminists have warned
against essentializing the feminine experience to reflect the experience of
privileged white women. 367 On the surface, it is fair to critique the emotionalwoman standard as essentializing the experiences of women. However, the
broader goal of the emotional-woman standard is to allow emotion to permeate
legal standards in the light of day. Women of all backgrounds have been labeled
hysterical. Women of all backgrounds have been deemed emotionally volatile,
and the emotional state of women has often been linked to their menstrual
cycles. 368 Yet, scientifically, it is not just women who make decisions by relying
on emotions. Human beings make decisions by relying on their emotions. 369 So,

363. See Bender, supra note 152, at 22 (“Because ‘reasonable man’ was intended to be a universal
term, the change to ‘reasonable person’ was thought to continue the same universal standard without
utilizing the gendered term ‘man.’ The language of tort law was neutered, made ‘politically correct,’
and sensitized. Although tort law protected itself from allegations of sexism, it did not change its
content and character.”).
364. See GILLIGAN, supra note 352, at 2.
365. See supra Part II.
366. See Rosalind Dixon, Feminist Disagreement (Comparatively) Recast, 31 HARV. J.L. & GENDER
277, 283–84 (2008).
367. See, e.g., Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
139, 151.
368. See, e.g., B. Jane Henderson & Cynthia Whissell, Changes in Women’s Emotions as a Function of
Emotion Valence, Self-Determined Category of Premenstrual Distress, and Day in the Menstrual Cycle, 80
PSYCH. REPS. 1272, 1274 (1997).
369. See supra Part II.
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in essence, the standard seeks to essentialize emotion to humankind. The
moniker “emotional woman” is a symbolic reminder that alternative voices,
including women’s voices, have been subordinated in the contours of legal
frameworks.
Finally, poststructural feminists offer an entirely different perspective of
gender subordination. Poststructural feminists argue that binaries such as
male/female, straight/lesbian, and normal/abnormal are used to construct a
dominant and a subordinate. 370 Essentializing the human experience to binaries
creates a permanent other or group that is lacking. Poststructural feminists are
not concerned with the differences between those categorized as men and
women; instead, they seek to demassify ways of thinking about the binaries of
male and female. 371 They seek to explore the possibility of subjectivities that are
both and neither. They believe that power is discursively constructed and
spatially and materially located. 372
With the number of people publicly identifying as transgender, nonbinary,
and intersex, poststructuralist feminist theories seem particularly salient today.
Societal structures at almost every facet revolve around binary distinctions
between male and female. As such, society tends to associate a certain set of
traits with females 373 and a different set of traits with males. 374 As the campaign
against toxic masculinity has suggested, such essentializing can create norms of
behavior that are counterproductive and harmful. 375 Thus, there are obvious and
admitted drawbacks to the emotional-woman standard. Mindful of the
drawbacks, this Article advocates for the emotional-woman standard
nonetheless because societal constructs are so strong that a person too often
conjures up the male default. The emotional-woman standard in practice aspires
370. See, e.g., Clare Cannon, Katie Lauve-Moon & Fred Buttell, Re-Theorizing Intimate Partner
Violence Through Post-Structural Feminism, Queer Theory, and the Sociology of Gender, 4 SOC. SCIS. 668,
671 (2015) (“The privileging of one group over the other establishes the first group as the norm or
referent in a binary construct.”).
371. See JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY
30–32 (1990).
372. See BRONWYN DAVIES, A BODY OF WRITING, 1990–1999, at 18–20 (2000).
373. JOHN E. WILLIAMS & DEBORAH L. BEST, MEASURING SEX STEREOTYPES: A
MULTINATION STUDY 77 (rev. ed. 1990) (finding that the traits of “emotional” and “softhearted” were
associated more with women than men in twenty-three of the twenty-five nations that they examined).
374. See Deborah S. David & Robert Brannon, The Male Sex Role: Our Culture’s Blueprint of
Manhood, and What It’s Done for Us Lately, in THE FORTY-NINE PERCENT MAJORITY: THE MALE
SEX ROLE 30 (Deborah S. David & Robert Brannon eds., 1976) (suggesting that the essential themes
of masculinity encompass the idealization of “reckless adventure, daring exploits, and bold excesses of
all kinds”); see also WILLIAMS & BEST, supra note 373 (finding that the traits of “dominant,”
“adventurous,” and “independent” were associated more with men than with women in all twenty-five
nations that they examined).
375. Melissa L. Breger, Reforming by Re-Norming: How the Legal System Has the Potential To Change
a Toxic Culture of Domestic Violence, 44 J. LEGIS. 170, 177–78 (2017) (“When a culture tolerates toxic
masculinity, the natural consequences flowing from the toxicity include gender-based sexual assault
and domestic violence.”).
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to evaluate whether conduct is emotionally appropriate given the subjective
traits of the defendant. It aims to evaluate conduct based on the characteristics
of the actual defendant and not a fictional character. As such, the standard
allows for evaluations that are nuanced and not the product of forced binaries.
In sum, the emotional-woman standard of care is a feminist standard of
care. By explicitly and intentionally using woman, the standard clearly departs
from the androcentric common law. Naming the standard the emotional-woman
standard of care, as opposed to the emotional-man or emotional-person
standard, begins to normalize a default other than a White male.
CONCLUSION
The reasonable-man standard for conceptualizing negligence is value
laden. Further, notions of reasonableness throughout the law are ill defined and
subjective. Although the primacy of reason has largely been accepted, the
centrality of reason is linked to the androcentric notions of fairness and justice.
As a feminist critique of the law, this Article argues that the centrality of
reasonableness in the law should be questioned.
Throughout history, women have been described pejoratively as hysterical
and emotional. The early jurists, all of whom were male, shunned emotion and
created legal paradigms in which it is almost universally accepted that rational
decision-making should be preferred over emotional decision-making. Yet years
of social science research has consistently shown that emotions are an integral
part of decision-making. This Article argues for reconceptualizing the centrality
of reason and replacing the reasonable-man standard with the emotional-woman
standard. Recognizing the myriad areas in which judges and juries evaluate
conduct based on reasonableness, this Article hopes to encourage further
exploration of how to replace reasonableness with emotion in other areas of the
law.

